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ABSTRACT 
 
 
How Good Intentions Backfire: Failures and Negative  
 
Consequences of Federal Environmental Policies 
 
by 
 
Jordan K. Lofthouse, Master of Science 
 
Utah State University, 2016 
 
 
Major Professor: Dr. William F. Shughart II 
Department: Economics and Finance 
 
 
For the past 50 years, Americans have turned to the federal government to solve 
pressing environmental problems like air and water pollution and climate change. Major 
environmental policies have helped improve environmental quality to varying degrees, 
but these policies also have resulted in negative consequences, such as high costs, 
inefficiency, violations of property rights, or environmental degradation. By applying 
public choice theory to the evolution of federal environmental policies, we can 
understand how negative consequences have arisen from seemingly good intentions. 
Public choice theory rejects the romantic notion that government officials work 
solely for the public good. Legislators and bureaucrats are rationally self-interested 
individuals who try to make themselves better off, like all people. Because legislators are 
interested in reelection and maximizing their power, they respond to special interest 
groups and lobbyists who can benefit them. Legislators often codify special benefits for 
certain companies or industries within environmental legislation and choose winners and 
losers, regardless of the economic or environmental outcomes. Environmental policies 
iv 
distort markets, altering the price signals that communicate what people value and 
imposing higher costs on taxpayers and consumers.  
 Legislators often write environmental laws vaguely, giving bureaucrats wide 
discretion on how to implement the laws. Bureaucrats often write environmental 
regulations quickly and without scientific evidence or limited economic considerations, 
making many of the regulations costly and ineffective in many cases. The number of 
regulations also grows each year, raising compliance costs while the marginal benefit of 
these regulations continues to decline.  
 Major federal environmental policies have had negative consequences, but experts 
have debated whether these outcomes were or were not intentional. Key politicians and 
bureaucrats may want to keep the current flawed laws in place because either they or 
their friends benefit from the status quo. Regardless of the intentionality or 
unintentionality of these negative consequences, large-scale federal environmental 
policies have provided decades of evidence that even the most nobly intended laws have 
significant drawbacks of which the public should be aware.  
(104 pages) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
 
 
How Good Intentions Backfire: 
 
Failures and Negative Consequences of Federal Environmental Policies 
 
Jordan K. Lofthouse 
 
This thesis is meant to dispel the myths that surround federal environmental 
policies. The research object of this project is to show that the formation of 
environmental policies is not altruistic, and the outcomes of these policies often have 
negative side effects that policymakers and the general public should recognize.  
During my time as an undergraduate, I studied environmental geography, which 
also included environmental policies. We would research environmental problems, but 
the solution to these problems always seemed to be another government policy. I began 
to wonder why environmental problems never seemed to actually get better. Once I began 
my master’s program in economics, I learned about economic ways of thinking and 
public choice theory, which explained why government policies fail. This thesis is meant 
to merge my undergraduate education with the knowledge from my master’s program.  
Collective decision-making is a messy, complex process and can lead to policies 
that backfire. Government policies do not magically solve environmental problems, and 
they can come with real economic and environmental costs. Understanding the process of 
how environmental laws are formed and implemented clarifies why undesirable outcomes 
result. The realities of environmental policies show that even the best intentions do not 
yield good outcomes. 
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THE RISE OF FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 
 
Since the beginning of the environmental movement in the 1960s, many 
Americans have developed an almost religious fervor regarding environmental quality 
and climate change. Countless special interest groups have sought to take advantage of 
the power and resources of the federal government to solve environmental problems. 
Average Americans see government policies and regulations as relatively uncontroversial 
means of addressing environmental degradation without considering the hidden costs and 
negative consequences that can accompany far-reaching laws. This project seeks to 
understand the process by which negative consequences emerge from federal 
environmental policies. I examine the legislative and bureaucratic forces that transform 
good intentions into policies that are often ineffective, inefficient, and contradictory to 
their original goals. 
In the 1960s, Americans' environmental consciousness began to blossom thanks 
to a series of highly publicized environmental disasters and rising economic prosperity 
that increased the demand for a “clean” environment. One of the most important catalysts 
for the environmental movement was Rachel Carson's 1962 book Silent Spring, which 
highlighted the dangers of the pesticide DDT.1 In 1969, the Cuyahoga River in 
Cleveland, Ohio, caught fire and the incident was reported across the United States as an 
environmental tragedy, even though the same river had experienced larger fires several 
times in previous years without drawing much public attention.2 From the 1960s and into 
the 1970s, American homes were bombarded with other stories of alarming 
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environmental disasters, like the Love Canal toxic waste scandal, the Santa Barbara oil 
spill, and the Three Mile Island nuclear disaster.3 
During that same period, the demographics and economics of the United States 
were changing, and people could afford to pay attention to environmental quality more 
closely than they had before. As average Americans became wealthier and more 
educated, they had more money and free time to devote to environmental consciousness. 
Environmental quality was steadily improving over the course of the 1960s and 1970s 
without federal policies, but environmental alarmism overshadowed the actual gains in 
environmental quality. Environmentalism became a mainstream concern in American 
households, and policymakers began to formulate policies to respond to their 
constituents' calls for environmental protection. At the federal level, politicians and 
bureaucrats worked to enact policies and regulations meant to help preserve the 
environment, or at least give the perception that they were helping. Manufacturing in the 
United States also began to decline during this time as the economy transitioned to more 
service-based industries. Some of this decline, however, can be explained by the rising 
cost of complying with U.S. environmental laws. Despite many heavy-polluting 
industries moving offshore, many Americans perceived that environmental quality was 
deteriorating and required federal intervention.4  
After passing landmark environmental laws in the 1960s and 1970s, policymakers 
have given little attention to the cost-effectiveness, efficiency, or overall environmental 
benefit from them. Some of the most far-reaching federal environmental laws dating from 
that era include the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Wilderness Act, and the 
National Environmental Policy Act. These policies have distorted markets and imposed 
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costs on taxpayers in return for uncertain benefits. This thesis uses a public choice 
framework to examine how and why these federal environmental policies were formed 
and the negative consequences that have arisen from them.  
PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY 
 
Public choice theory is a field of political economy that explains why and how 
governments fail. Government failure is a parallel to market failure in standard 
economics. All people pursue activities that benefit them net of costs, and public choice 
asserts that officials in the public sector are self-interested like those in the private sector. 
In other words, government officials act the same in the private sphere as they do in the 
public sphere.5 When forming environmental regulations, policymakers do not always 
make regulations based on altruistic intentions or pure environmental benevolence. They 
make environmental policies strategically for their own advantage. When politicians' 
incentives align, environmental laws can benefit environmental quality, but politicians 
may have other goals that impose harm on the economy or the environment. Because 
policymakers are not all-knowing or benevolent, government failures result. 
Individuals are utility maximizers, meaning they work to achieve the maximum 
amount of benefits from their choices net of costs. Those in government are no different 
in that regard. Politicians want to be reelected, and so they strategically pursue policies 
that will increase their chances of remaining in office. Seeking reelection leads to policies 
with dispersed costs and concentrated benefits, as special interest groups reap the benefit, 
but the cost of policies is spread throughout the entire population.6 
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Public choice theory uses "methodological individualism," which asserts that 
individuals, not groups, have preferences and make choices. Individuals work together as 
groups to make policies because collective action requires agreement with others before 
political goals can be attained. Congress is a group of rational actors that pursue their 
parochial interests, not a group of benevolent actors that unite exclusively for the public 
good. A legislator's self-interest may help to further the well-being of society, but it may 
also hinder societal well-being.7  
At the most basic level, regular citizens advocate for government-enacted 
regulations to ensure their own health, safety, and justice because they are self-interested 
and rational. Despite what the general public wants from regulations, special interest 
groups tend to dominate the policy process. Special interest groups are composed of 
rationally self-interested individuals who seek regulations as a tool to get what they want 
under the guise of public benefit. Specific industries or companies benefit from lobbying 
and rent-seeking for special government privileges. Environmental protection policies 
and regulations are not exempt from the foibles of the political process. They are formed 
the same way as any other regulation that allows certain interests or industries to benefit 
at the expense of others. When politicians, bureaucrats, and special interests work to 
maximize their own self-interest, environmental policies can have negative consequences 
and unseen costs that burden taxpayers and the environment. 
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INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR MAKING POLICIES  
Constitutions and Decision Rules 
In the simplest terms, constitutions serve as the "rules of the game" for how 
legislators and bureaucrats make decisions and how much power they can have. One of 
the main functions of constitutions is to establish a contract between the government and 
the people being ruled and establish a government's legitimacy through the rule of law. 
Constitutions authorize the collective decision-making process, such as majority rule or 
unanimous consent. Constitutions also set up the framework for how interest groups 
interact with legislators and bureaucrats and dictate how politicians and bureaucrats can 
choose winners and losers.  
Because constitutions are the foundation for all political institutions, public choice 
scholars study constitutional formation. The role of formal constitutions has evolved over 
time as political philosophers have viewed governments differently. In The Prince, one of 
the foundational works of political philosophy, Machiavelli asserted that rule of law is 
derived from force and the legitimacy of government came from the divine right of 
kings.8 Thomas Hobbes, a seventeenth-century English philosopher, believed that human 
nature is violent, and so people willingly give up their absolute liberty to a sovereign to 
protect themselves from others’ violent natures.9 John Locke, a seventeenth-century 
English philosopher after Hobbes, argued that people form social contracts with a 
government in which they give up some rights to ensure their protection. Locke said that 
people retain the right to withdraw their loyalty if the government violates the contract.10 
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The writers of the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution relied on 
Locke’s theory that government's legitimacy comes from the consent of the governed.  
The U.S. Constitution set up a winner-takes-all voting system that was meant to 
reflect the will of the majority while also protecting the rights of the minority. The voting 
system, however, is flawed because it allows minorities to easily capture the legislative 
process for their own gain at the expense of the majority. Politicians have little incentive 
to be responsive to the public’s general needs because doing so does not guarantee them 
campaign finances or reelection. Special interest groups are minorities that can 
disproportionately exert their influence on elected officials because these groups are 
powerful voting blocs that can contribute money and other forms of political support to 
political parties and candidates. Even though a majority of people may prefer one 
outcome to another, the majority's preference may not be as intense as the minority's, so 
the minority will exert a greater influence on elected officials. Elected officials then 
pursue policies with the least amount of cost to the general public but the greatest 
benefits allocated to their supporters. Thus, elected officials often legislate on behalf of 
special interest groups, rather than the general good. Although the Founding Fathers 
intended elections to serve as a check on politicians, the U.S. voting system has allowed 
the will of the minority to be more powerful than the will of the majority in many cases. 
Decision by majority rule is also problematic because voting outcomes do not 
necessarily reflect a single, unambiguous aggregation of individual preferences. In many 
cases, if a group of three or more people must choose among three or more options, a 
majority may be opposed to every one of them; majority rule may therefore be 
indecisive.11 Economist Kenneth Arrow, a forefather of public choice theory, taught that 
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no voting rule (other than dictatorship) reliably translates individual preferences into a 
unique group preference.12 Because of this phenomenon, a collective decision in a group 
can be impossible or subject to manipulation. Agenda setters who decide the order of 
voting, such as the Speaker of the House, can manipulate outcomes simply by changing 
the order of what is being voted on. People who vote insincerely, that is, cast votes for 
lesser ranked alternatives to avoid an even worse outcome, can also manipulate the 
outcomes of the voting process. Different rules for aggregating individual preferences can 
yield different winners, so the “general will” does not exist in any meaningful sense. 
Separate Branches of Government 
The U.S. Constitution contains institutional checks on government power to 
ensure that one branch of government does not become tyrannical. The Founding Fathers 
also codified rights within the Bill of Rights to create a strong institutional framework to 
limit government’s ability to take away liberty. These checks and balances are not 
failsafe, and loopholes have allowed the erosion of personal liberty and the expansion of 
governmental authority. 
The division of power among the three branches was meant to limit government 
power, but over the course of U.S. history, all branches of government have grown in size 
and scope. One phenomenon that the Founding Fathers may not have foreseen was the 
emergence of a bureaucratic state. Bureaucracies are given large leeway on how to 
enforce laws. Congress usually writes laws in abstract terms and then allows the 
government agencies to implement laws by writing rules and regulations. Regulators 
have unparalleled power to enact policies because they are not elected and have little 
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accountability for their actions, especially in the environmental sector. The 
Environmental Protection Agency has nearly unlimited power concerning environmental 
regulation, and the policies enacted vary differently from state to state as the bureaucrats 
decide which parts of the law to strongly enforce and which parts can be given more 
leeway.  
There are only four checks on bureaucratic actions: congressional oversight 
committees, the amount allocated to agencies in the budget, the chief executive’s power 
to appoint agency heads with the advice and consent of the Senate, and people who sue 
regulators. Congressional oversight committees are constrained in their effective 
oversight because of the imbalance of information that passes from the agency to the 
committee. Congressmen can also incur large time costs to effectively oversee 
bureaucracies, and congressmen often have limited time because they devote scarce 
resources to reelection and drafting legislation. As rationally self-interested actors, 
bureaucrats in regulatory agencies are incentivized to show that they need larger and 
larger budgets each year. Because legislators do not accurately know how much money 
bureaucrats actually need to fulfill their responsibilities, legislators often increase budgets 
each year with few questions. Bureaucrats formulate regulations to maximize their 
budgets and secure their jobs, so they rarely cut costs and often provide services beyond 
what society demands.13 The most effective check on bureaucratic behavior is 
prosecution against agencies’ conduct. This check, however, is costly for individuals to 
pursue and usually means a class-action suit, which is difficult to organize.  
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Property Rights 
The U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights protect property rights because the 
Founding Fathers believed that that was the chief role of government.14 Property rights 
are the foundation of mutually beneficial exchange, which allows markets to flourish.15 
Owning private property incentivizes people to create value. When property rights do not 
exist or are not enforced, "the tragedy of the commons" may materialize. The tragedy of 
the commons occurs when people have unlimited access to a scarce resource and that 
resource is depleted. Rational people try to maximize their own well-being as quickly as 
possible and do not take into account the costs imposed on other users. In the simplest 
terms, when everyone owns something, no one particular person has the incentive to take 
care of it. For example, the Native Americans often over-consumed bison in the West 
because each tribe was incentivized to kill the bison for their tribe faster than the other 
tribes could.16  
Property rights counteract the tragedy of the commons by incentivizing people to 
cultivate and manage their property for maximum future returns. For example, the 
invention of barbed wire on the Great Plains solved an overgrazing problem by 
establishing property rights. Ranchers allowed vast herds of cattle to overgraze the Great 
Plains and eat farmers' crops. Farmers could do little to keep the herds out of their 
farmland, so they used barbed wire to solve the problem of trespass. Voluntary action 
solved the overgrazing of cattle by creating clear, enforceable property lines.17  
Governments are a common and powerful way to enforce property rights, but they 
are not the only way. Less formal systems exist where people voluntarily cooperate to 
establish enforced property rights. As Robert Ellickson asserts, "law is not central to the 
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maintenance of social order" in many cases.18 Especially in the United States, knowing 
the contents of every law is very costly for people in the general population. The legal 
system has such high costs for resolving disputes that many people simply ignore the law 
and resort to informal and more efficient ways to resolve disputes. For example, 
Ellickson found that residents in rural Shasta County, California, resolve disputes over 
cattle trespassing and property boundaries informally without having to engage in the 
costly legal process. Social interactions function as the mechanism for property rights 
enforcement, rather than the actual legal system.19 
Concentrated Benefits and Dispersed Costs 
Government-granted privileges benefit certain interest groups who are able to 
capture policymakers at the expense of everyone else. Despite being seemingly unfair, 
this preferential treatment remains in effect because the benefits are concentrated on a 
small group, but the costs are dispersed over a much larger population. Through 
concentrated benefits and dispersed costs, preferential treatment is able to last for 
decades, even though the policies may cause net social harm.  
Mancur Olson, an economist at the University of Maryland, College Park, 
provided the foundational theories for concentrated benefits and dispersed costs in his 
book The Logic of Collective Action. Special interest groups want the government to give 
them preferential treatment so that they can make the most profit, but it seems that a large 
coalition of people would fight back against special privileges that increases profits for 
one small group at the expense of everyone else, as well as increasing prices and reducing 
efficiency for the majority of people. Coalitions of people rarely fight against government 
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privilege simply because the costs outweigh the benefits. It is irrational for a person to 
spend time, money, and resources to fight government-granted privilege because the cost 
of that privilege to a single person is small. People involved in special interests, however, 
have every incentive to continue lobbying for privileges because the rewards they reap 
are great. When the benefits are concentrated in the hands of a few and the costs are 
dispersed among the whole population, special interests will continue to seek privileges 
that allow them to benefit and the rest of the population will not fight back because it is 
too costly to do so.20 
George Stigler found patterns similar to Olson. Stigler gives an example of "group 
X." Group X wants a certain government policy that will benefit its members. Group X 
will only harm non-X people a small amount because the government will force all non-
X people to give up only a little. Because the amount of harm to non-X people is 
relatively small, it does not make economic sense for non-X people to discover that they 
are being taken advantage of and then work to get the policy removed. The current 
political system is designed to help express the preferences of majorities and the strongly 
felt preferences of minorities. The system disregards majorities or minorities that have 
small stakes in policy outcomes. 21 
The political process alters how costs and benefits from government policies are 
spread among the population, so legislators shift government policies away from ones 
that will give the most efficient outcomes. Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen found that 
government policies and projects are larger than circumstances may warrant otherwise 
because the people who benefit bear only a small fraction of the cost burden.22 A 
government policy's costs are paid for from a "common pool," so each beneficiary will 
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want to consume more from the common pool as the share of the costs is smaller for each 
political constituency.23 The policies or projects grow larger and become less efficient as 
people demand more and pay less. 
LEGISLATURES 
Interventionism 
Legislators claim that they should use the force of the government to solve market 
failures. For the past 50 years, policymakers have considered environmental problems as 
market failures and have justified government intervention as the solution. Even when 
environmental issues are not market failures, many government officials assert that it is 
the government's responsibility to resolve environmental issues. Public choice theorists, 
however, argue that government intervention can be more harmful than allowing the 
market to find a solution.  
Governments can intervene in the market only by force or the threat of force.24 As 
Ludwig Von Mises stated: 
“It is important to remember that government interference always means either 
violent action or the threat of such action … taxes are paid because the taxpayers 
are afraid of offering resistance to the tax gatherers. … Government is in the last 
resort the employment of armed men, of policemen. gendarmes, soldiers, prison 
guards, and hangmen. The essential feature of government is the enforcement of 
its decrees by beating, killing, and imprisoning. Those who are asking for more 
government interference are asking ultimately for more compulsion and less 
freedom.”25 
The market cannot be regulated to force people to become less self-interested or 
more altruistic. Rather, intervention in a market simply puts the pressure on the producers 
of a good who are responding to consumers’ expressed preferences. To truly change 
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society’s environmental behaviors, producers and consumers must change their 
behaviors. Producers and consumers change their behavior only when it is beneficial for 
them. Government's interference precludes the market from finding better approaches to 
environmental problems and can generate perverse incentives. 
Seeking Government Policies: "Bootleggers and Baptists" 
People in both the private and the public spheres are utility maximizers and, as 
such, they try to make themselves better off. In the public sphere, actors can pursue that 
goal by approaching legislators to draft and pass laws they prefer. Bruce Yandle, an 
economist from Clemson University and George Mason University’s Mercatus Center, 
developed the "Bootleggers and Baptists" theory to explain how special interests capture 
the legislative process for their own benefit. Yandle developed the theory in the early 
1980s when he was the Executive Director of the Federal Trade Commission. As he 
served in that post, he attempted to explain the nature of regulations and the kind of 
support that brings regulation about. Yandle found that most special interests pushing 
new rules or strengthening old ones are comprised of two distinct sub-groups, which 
Yandle has termed "bootleggers" and "Baptists." "Baptists" are people who advocate for 
a government regulation for a moral or safety reason, like Baptists in the South used to 
advocate outlawing the sale of liquor on Sundays. "Bootleggers" advocate for 
government regulations for more narrow-minded reasons. Bootleggers, like Baptists, 
wanted regulations to limit Sunday liquor sales, but bootleggers want the law simply 
because they could profit by selling more liquor in a restricted market. 
14 
In this theory, "Baptists" do the majority of lobbying while the "bootleggers" 
benefit at their expense. Because Baptists are motivated by religious and moral concerns, 
they make sure that the law is obeyed. The bootleggers can profit because the Baptists 
enforce legal liquor stores’ cartel-like agreement not to sell alcohol on Sundays. Within a 
Baptist-bootlegger coalition, Yandle has found that regulations are durable insofar as the 
Baptists and the bootleggers have a common objective.26  
Like any special interest, the environmental movement comprises a Baptist-
bootlegger element. Environmentalists are the "Baptists" in this scenario because they 
argue that environmental concerns are health, safety, and moral issues that necessitate 
government intervention. Other groups can free-ride on environmentalists' lobbying so 
that they too can receive government favors and privileges. Sometimes "bootleggers" 
masquerade as "Baptists," especially in environmental causes. Some companies or 
industries use a mask of environmentalism to reap economic benefits from favorable 
government policies. These "bootlegger" groups and industries overstate their green 
credentials, public spiritedness, or cost-effectiveness to claim a "moral high ground" that 
will persuade policymakers to give them privileges and persuade the public to urge the 
creation of supportive policies. While policymakers and the public are distracted by 
environmental rhetoric, many industries can benefit financially from direct government 
handouts and restricted competition.27 Larger polluters often seek out strict "command-
and-control" regulations that mandate specific technologies for reducing emissions. 
These regulations raise compliance costs industry-wide and benefit the large producers 
who can spread those costs over larger volumes of output. This process means that these 
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types of environmental regulation can produce intra-industry wealth transfers from small 
firms to larger ones.  
In more concrete terms, environmental "Baptists" are joining forces with some 
low-carbon energy companies. The environmentalist groups want to restrict carbon 
emissions and institute cap-and-trade legislation because they believe that carbon 
emissions will cause economic and environmental harm to themselves and others; thus, 
they have a moral argument for requiring government regulations. Low-carbon energy 
companies are the "bootleggers" because limits on carbon emissions would allow them to 
make more profit in a restricted energy market. In particular, the nuclear industry, natural 
gas industry, and other renewable energy industries all favor restricted carbon emissions 
and cap-and-trade policies because these policies limit competition from the coal 
industry, which is the largest electricity producing fuel in the United States. Limiting 
competition from their biggest competitor supplies a strong financial incentive for these 
low-carbon energy industries to favor these environmental policies. Brokerage firms are 
another "bootlegger" in this scenario because cap-and-trade legislation will allow the 
brokerage firms to manage the sales of the new permits and certificates in a cap-and-trade 
system. A mandatory government regime that allows buyers and sellers to trade permits 
and licenses requires the services of brokers to operate smoothly. “Cap-and-trade” 
policies thus will increase the demand for brokerage services and make the owners of the 
firms that supply them wealthier.28 
The recent initiatives in California to legalize the sale of marijuana are another 
blatant example of the bootleggers and Baptist theory. The "Baptists" are people who 
oppose marijuana on moral grounds and want to keep it illegal because of its potential 
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harms to health and safety. The "bootleggers" in this case are current marijuana farmers 
in northern California, particularly Humboldt County, who were growing marijuana 
outside the law, and could make large profits without paying taxes. Another faction of 
"bootleggers" is business owners in northern California. Many business owners support 
the illegal marijuana growers because the illegal marijuana industry stimulates the local 
economy. If marijuana were legalized, not only would the illegal marijuana growers lose 
market share, the local businesses would be harmed because one of their community's 
major sources of income would shrink. In recent years, many people who opposed the 
legalization of marijuana for moral reasons have become much less vocal in their 
opposition. Yandle asserts that when the "Baptists" become less vocal, the "bootleggers" 
lose a key coalition partner. In other words, for regulations to endure, both the "Baptist" 
and "bootlegger" factions must be very active and vocal; otherwise the regulations likely 
will be phased out.29  
Case Study: Clean Air Act of 1970 
The lobbying process leading to passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970 (CAA) is a 
prime example of a Bootlegger-Baptist relationship. Environmentalists, as the "Baptists," 
supported stricter regulations on the burning of fossil fuels and damaging air quality. 
Coal companies from the eastern United States, as the "bootleggers," also supported the 
CAA because the legislation would reduce competition and increase profits.  
Coal from the western United States contains less sulfur than eastern coal, making 
the western coal cleaner. The CAA required power plants to install scrubbers regardless 
of how much pollution a power plant produced. Eastern coal was less expensive and 
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became the dominant coal in the market, so eastern coal companies supported the CAA 
as a way to increase their profits at the expense of western coal companies.30 Eastern coal 
companies used the moral arguments of the environmentalists to create a policy that 
distorted the market in their favor. 
Section 111 of the Clean Air Act clearly exemplifies a “bootleggers and Baptists” 
coalition to achieve different objectives through the same regulation. Section 111 
exempted existing stationary sources of pollution from the same CAA requirements as 
new stationary sources of pollution. Environmentalists supported the CAA to clean the 
air and prevent further damage to the environment. Industrialists, looking to limit new 
competitors, also supported the CAA because they would be protected as existing 
stationary sources under Section 111. Labor unions wanted to avoid power plants and 
other polluters from relocating to right-to-work states in the South and West. 
Additionally, the politicians involved were looking to appear more environmentally 
friendly for the next round of elections. With all groups working together in an effort to 
promote their own self-serving causes and interests, the CAA had enough support to 
become law. 
Favor Trading, Political Competition, and Lame Duck Sessions 
Environmental laws are rarely born out of pure environmental concern. Through a 
system of favor trading, political competition, and lame duck sessions, legislators pass 
environmental laws that are meant to benefit themselves more than they are meant to 
benefit the environment. Favor trading is one of the most common ways legislators pass 
their favorite laws. Lawmakers work to maximize support from their constituency, as 
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well as powerful special interests to boost campaign contributions and sway voters. 
Legislators often vote for privileges to benefit other constituencies or special interests 
unrelated to them because they can vote-trade with other legislators. Legislators may 
strike a deal with one another to support each other's pet projects in a swap. In The 
Calculus of Consent, Buchanan and Tullock describe this phenomenon, which is often 
called logrolling.31 
For example, an Idaho congressman would likely vote for special privileges for 
the potato industry or an Iowa congressman would likely vote for special privileges for 
the corn industry. By helping powerful special interests in their districts or states, 
legislators can gain support and money, which will lead to a higher chance for reelection. 
An Idaho congressman may make a deal with an Iowa congressman to vote for corn 
subsidies if the Iowa congressman votes for potato subsidies. By favor trading, the two 
politicians help themselves by helping other congressmen with their pet projects. 
In contrast to favor-trading, opposing politicians may support similar policies 
when they are competing against each other to capture the same constituency. Policies are 
passed more easily when a Democrat and a Republican running for the same office want 
to appeal to the same subset of the voters. Especially with environmental policy, 
opposing candidates may support similar policies to appear more “green” than the other 
to capture as many votes as possible. When both parties want to appear more 
environmentally conscious, environmental laws are passed more quickly and with less 
opposition. 
Congress and the president may use a lame duck session to pass even larger, more 
controversial laws because defeated members do not have to worry about facing the 
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voters again. Lame duck sessions allow congressmen to pass laws they support that may 
have been politically unviable before an election. In essence, lame duck sessions allow 
congressman to pass whatever laws they want with minimal repercussions because the 
next election is as far away as possible.  
Case Study: The Passage of the Clean Air Act 
The 1970 CAA was not the result of altruistic environmental concern. The CAA 
came about because rival politicians were seeking to appear more environmentally 
friendly to increase their chances on Election Day. Senator Edmund Muskie from Maine 
was considered to be one of the most likely candidates for the Democratic nomination in 
the 1972 presidential election. Muskie presented himself as an environmental candidate 
and refuted consumer activist Ralph Nader's claims that he was “a pawn of the Maine 
pulp and paper industry.”32 Muskie sponsored the Senate bill that eventually became the 
Clean Air Act. 
President Richard Nixon, seeking reelection in 1972, endorsed a similar bill in the 
House of Representatives. With the support of these two influential politicians, the CAA 
passed the Senate by a unanimous vote and the House by a vote of 374-1.33 Nixon also 
reorganized various components of the federal government to form the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA).34 Nixon used these efforts largely to appear more 
environmentally conscious for reelection.  
The lead lobbyist for the United Steelworkers, Jack Sheehan, led a group of 
lobbyists to petition for a provision in the CAA that would prevent companies from 
moving to states that already met the CAA’s air quality standards. Neither Democrats nor 
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Republicans wanted to appear to be the cause of industrial job losses, so they included the 
provision in the law.35 This provision became Section 111 of the CAA, which favors 
existing stationary sources of pollution at the expense new stationary sources. 
Case Study: The Passage of CERCLA 
Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) as a hurried response to the 1980 election. Under 
the Carter Administration, Congress and the executive branch had worked together to 
form new environmental regulations that were meant to improve environmental quality 
nationwide. Environmental scandals, such as the Love Canal toxic waste incident, 
prompted Congress to support a bill for toxic waste clean-up, but no bills were successful 
in the early part of 1980. In November 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected president, and 
many members of Congress feared that the Reagan Administration would undo many of 
the environmental regulations that the Carter Administration had put into place.36 
Congress responded to those fears by quickly pushing through the CERCLA bill during a 
post-election lame duck session. Lame duck President Jimmy Carter signed the bill into 
law on December 11, 1980.37,38  
Many people saw CERCLA as the solution for the various contaminated sites 
around the country because it addressed the problem of "legacy pollution" by forcing 
liable parties to clean up abandoned toxic waste sites.39,40 Because CERCLA was rushed 
through Congress so quickly, many of its provisions were not fully understood or subject 
to debate. The lack of clarity from the hastily written law resulted in numerous court 
cases that sought to rescue the law from its unclear wording. The first case that tried to 
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clarify the law was a 1983 case, Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff.41 Federal District Court 
Judge David Dowd Jr. stated that “CERCLA was rushed through a lame duck session of 
Congress” and noted that it “might not have received adequate drafting.”42 Because the 
law was written so quickly, more than forty drafting errors were identified in it after it 
was passed.43  
Case Study: The Passage of the Clean Water Act 
The push for federal water-quality control under the 1972 Clean Water Act 
(CWA) resulted from public figures claiming that pollution was increasing when it 
actually was improving. Misinformed public outcry pressured federal lawmakers to 
appease voters by passing the CWA. Congress became impatient with the pace of state-
led action under the 1965 Amendments and took control of water pollution issues with 
the CWA in an effort to please an increasingly agitated electorate.  
Environmental groups, such as the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), the 
Environmental Law Institute, Friends of the Earth, and the National Resources Defense 
Fund, were influential in mobilizing public support for federal water pollution control.44 
Rachel Carson's Silent Spring also drew public attention to the fact that pesticide runoff 
carried serious health risks, increasing public agitation over water pollution issues.45 
Ralph Nader, Barry Commoner, and the Club of Rome helped convince the public that 
water pollution was becoming worse and that federal control was necessary.46 Despite 
having no evidence to verify these claims, it became an “uncontested truth” that water 
quality in the United States was deteriorating.47 As rationally self-interested actors, 
environmental activists like Nader and Commoner based their livelihoods on public 
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alarm concerning the environment. Environmental activists have a vital stake in 
portraying environmental issues in frightening terms that demand immediate action.48 
Without public panic over environmental conditions, environmental activists are less 
likely to obtain notoriety and funding.  
After the passage of the CWA, a 1974 National Water Quality Inventory report 
presented evidence that the water quality of many waterways was improving before the 
1972 CWA took effect. According to this study, between 1963 and 1974, twenty of 
twenty-eight pollutants had declined in over half of the sampled waterways.49 As the 
public became more involved in the environmental movement, the amount of pollutants 
fell even before the federal government took charge of regulation.50  
A recent study by professors at Iowa State University and Yale University 
calculated trends in the national water quality of rivers that are swimmable and fishable. 
The results confirm that water quality was improving prior to the passage of the 1972 
CWA. Water pollution was declining faster before the 1972 Amendments passed and 
slowed soon after its passage. The reduced rate of improvement after the 1972 CWA 
could be attributed to various factors, but it may largely be due to heightened public 
awareness and state/local control under 1965 Amendments to the Clean Water Act. The 
1971 National Water Commission Report showed that all fifty states prepared and 
submitted standards concerning the quality of interstate waterways in compliance with 
the 1965 CWA and were engaged in implementing regulations to achieve those 
standards.51 Forty-seven of the fifty states already were regulating the largest point source 
polluters with permit programs and a national median of eighty-eight percent of polluters 
in the industrial field were regulated through permitting processes.52 All of this action 
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was planned and enforced by state and local government action, not federal. Water 
quality clearly was improving prior to the 1972 CWA and the narrative that federal 
control was necessary to improve American waterways was a misrepresentation of the 
facts. 
Democratic Senator Edmund Muskie, sponsor and chief architect of the 1972 
CWA, had substantial political incentives to promote the law. Muskie, the former 
governor of Maine, was a prominent environmentalist in his home state. Muskie 
advocated for more government regulation as an attempt to preserve Maine's natural 
resources and boost economic growth.53 Muskie became Maine's first Democrat to be 
popularly elected to the U.S. Senate.54 During his first term in Congress, Muskie became 
the chairman of the Special Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee55 and used this 
position to hold hearings throughout the country to, in his own words, “stir up public 
interest” concerning water pollution and after “a lot of hard work over two years, we got 
momentum started for the [new, national environmental] legislation.”56  
As early as 1963, Muskie sought federal control over water quality and worked to 
build a national constituency. Muskie’s pollution agenda was necessary for his political 
career. His platform contained economic revitalization through natural resources 
conservation. As a self-interested politician, he helped nationalize the problem of water 
pollution to benefit his home state of Maine.  
In 1972, Muskie was one of the most prominent Democratic presidential 
candidates to run against Republican incumbent Richard Nixon.57 Muskie’s push for 
federal water pollution control coincided with his attempt to establish a national profile 
for his White House bid. Muskie introduced the 1972 Amendments to the CWA on 
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October 28, 1971,58 when he had been informally “running [for president] for more than a 
year.”59 During the latter part of 1971, Muskie visited 34 of the 50 states and spent over 
$1 million in preparation for his presidential run. He entered the race officially on 
January 4, 1972, just months after introducing the 1972 CWA.60 Widespread public 
concern over the environment and pollution gave Muskie political incentives to 
prominently nationalize the issue. The Clean Water Act of 1972 removed state and local 
control because federal control became a powerful political tool for election. 
Government Tools to Grant Privilege 
Legislators Picking Winners and Losers 
Legislators have many tools to extend special privileges to certain industries, 
firms, or political pressure groups, and these special privileges benefit both the legislator 
and the winners he chooses. Matthew Mitchell, Senior Research Fellow at the Mercatus 
Center at George Mason University, describes many of the ways that special interests can 
benefit from government policies in "The Pathology of Privilege." Lawmakers and 
bureaucrats routinely choose winners and losers from a variety of special interests, both 
rivals and coalition members. Environmental policymaking is no different. Mitchell 
describes the perverse side-effect of this special treatment: "Whatever its guise, 
government-granted privilege is an extraordinarily destructive force. It misdirects 
resources, impedes genuine economic progress, breeds corruption, and undermines the 
legitimacy of both the government and the private sector."61  
Most special interests have strong lobbying arms that compete for preferential 
treatment from politicians and bureaucrats. Because government officials can grant 
25 
certain types of favors to certain companies or industries, many of these interests spend 
time, money, and resources trying to gain the favor of regulators who can increase their 
economic gains while at the same time hamstringing their rivals. Some of these forms of 
government-granted privilege include corporate bailouts, subsidies, price and entry 
regulations, tax credits, contrived monopolies, non-competitive bids, loan guarantees, and 
trade protections.62 Because industries can help themselves to rents by capturing the favor 
of politicians and bureaucrats, they spend large amounts of money lobbying and 
contributing to campaign war chests as means of persuasion. Policymakers are rationally 
self-interested in reelection and retaining their jobs, so they respond to these forms of 
persuasion. Politicians are rarely experts in the energy production or environmental 
science, so they are prone to support interests that lobby and financially support them in 
return. Politicians also want to promote interests that are economically beneficial to their 
constituents to increase their chances of reelection.63 
Once policymakers have extended privileges to certain interests, society as a 
whole bears extra costs. Policies that favor certain industries restrict competition in the 
market, which leads to higher prices and lower quality goods and services. Time, money, 
and resources are also wasted when industries seek government favors for themselves. 
Those resources could have been put to a better social use by engaging in research to find 
more efficient, cost-effective, or reliable products and services.64 
Another problem with privilege is that it can induce cronyism. Regulators, 
whether they are politicians or bureaucrats, can give preferential treatment to their friends 
and allies at the expense of taxpayers and other interests. Cronyism becomes especially 
harmful because of the "revolving door" between the public and private sectors. The term 
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"revolving door" refers to the tendency of former politicians and bureaucrats to receive 
jobs in the industries they once oversaw as government officials. On the other hand, the 
revolving door includes people who worked in industries that receive jobs in regulatory 
agencies as politicians or bureaucrats. In other words, industry insiders can create policies 
for their former colleagues.65 
Government-sanctioned privileges are detrimental to society because this 
preferential treatment generally causes prices to go up, quality to go down, and 
innovation to stagnate. In other words, when the government uses its monopoly of force 
to distort markets, people are limited in how they engage in mutually beneficial 
exchange, which restricts how much progress individuals and society can achieve. In the 
most blatant form, government-sanctioned preferential treatment makes rich, well-
connected people even richer while everyone else bears the cost.66 
George Stigler, an economist at the University of Chicago and a recipient of the 
Nobel Prize in Economics, explored the economic effects of government policies in a 
1971 journal article titled "The Theory of Economic Regulation." Stigler finds that 
special interest can use the political process to benefit themselves through narrowly 
targeted policies or regulations. Stigler asserts that government officials use the 
government's power to forcibly take money from or allocate money to selectively help or 
hurt certain industries. Although some industries seek out regulations specific for their 
own benefit, other industries may have detrimental policies forced upon them. Stigler 
states, however, that regulations generally are acquired by industries because decision-
makers in those industries ensure that regulations are crafted in a certain way to benefit 
them.67  
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Government favoritism often causes a net economic loss. When a specific 
industry or interest receives preferential treatment from the government, the benefit to the 
single industry or interest will be less than the total damage to the rest of the community. 
This economic loss is similar to deadweight loss that is caused by a monopoly in an 
industry. 68  
Even though special interests vie for preferential treatment, Gordon Tullock, one 
of the founding figures of the public choice field, observed that the special benefits of 
government-granted privilege often are short-lived, or "transitional." Tullock asserted that 
modern governments work to actively grant special privileges to politically influential 
people. These privileges, however, do not lead to long-term profitability for the interests 
or industries that they are meant to benefit. Even if government regulations are clearly 
meant to give preferential treatment to a particular special interest, the benefits run out 
quickly. In Tullock's words, special privileges "do not seem to do much good" because 
rents are capitalized into asset prices or into the market value of a regulated firm when it 
is sold to new owners. 
When the government establishes special privileges for a group of people, the 
late-comers will not benefit as much as the original beneficiaries. After the government 
creates a regulation that restricts market entry or creates a monopoly, the incumbent firms 
in the industry are able to profit while the rest of society suffers a deadweight loss from 
the lack of competition. Over time, the value of the monopoly profits is taken into 
account by the industry as a whole, so new entrants into the restricted markets make only 
normal profits under the regulatory regime. The regulations persist even though the 
people in the regulatory market no longer make the monopoly profits because removing 
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the regulation would flood the market with competition, making the incumbents in the 
market far less profitable. Unfortunately, everyone in the protected industry will be 
harmed if the privilege were taken away, which is why government privileges last far 
longer than the reasons why the privileges were originally enacted.69 
Effects of Subsidies, Loan Guarantees, and Restricted Market Entry 
Some of the most destructive forms of privilege are subsidies, loan guarantees, 
and restricted market entry. Environmental laws often contain provisions that provide 
subsidies and loan guarantees for certain industries or energy sources. In nearly every 
industry, environmental laws restrict market entry to some degree by erecting costly 
barriers for new entrants to overcome.  
Subsidies are one of the most blatant forms of government-granted privilege, and 
laws like the Energy Policy Act (EPAct) of 2005 contain billions of dollars of subsidies 
for nearly every energy industry. Overall, the agricultural industry receives the largest 
amount of subsidization from the federal government, but the EPAct greatly expanded 
the amount of subsidies directed at the energy industry. For example, the energy industry 
received over $14 billion in direct subsidies in 2010 originating in the EPAct and other 
federal policies.70 
Subsidies distort market supply and demand and alter price signals that convey 
information about what people value. In an unfettered free market, buyers and sellers 
interact with one another to make each other better off. The seller has something that the 
buyer wants, and the buyer has something that the seller wants. When the two engage in 
trade, they both benefit. If one of the parties to this transaction was not made better off, 
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than that party would not participate in the trade. Voluntary exchange is mutually 
beneficial to those who participate, which is one of the core tenets of economics. 
Nationwide and worldwide economies are extremely complex when taken as a whole, but 
they are simply large collections of mutually beneficial trades. Competitive markets are 
more likely to produce better outcomes for buyers and sellers alike. More competitive 
markets tend to emerge in three cases: first, when property rights are well-defined; 
second, when the costs of negotiating the terms of trade are small relative to expected 
gains; and third, when barriers to entering or exiting an industry are minimal.71 
Government policies that provide special privileges to certain industries or 
companies can lower the benefits from exchange. Government policies that distort 
normal market processes can also lower economic growth and harm the private sector 
overall while certain favored industries profit.72 
Some companies and industries received more indirect financial support through 
loan guarantees or subsidies given to energy customers. Under the EPAct's Title XVII, 
Sections 1702 and 1705 allow the Energy Department to make loan guarantees to specific 
energy companies.73,74 One of the worst outcomes from the loan guarantee program 
happened with an energy company called Solyndra. In 2009, federal government granted 
Solyndra $535 million in loan guarantees. Under the loan guarantee program, the 
company would have to repay back its debt if it was financially successful. If the 
company was not financially successful, the taxpayers would absorb the losses. Two 
years after Solyndra received the loan guarantee, it filed for bankruptcy and fired its 
1,100 employees. Taxpayers were stuck with the cost of the loan. Solyndra is only one of 
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dozens of companies that have used the loan guarantee program to shield themselves 
from uncertainty at the taxpayers' expense.75 
By creating additional regulations, government policies restrict market entry to 
industry newcomers. These market restrictions limit the competitiveness of markets and 
interfere with the voluntary processes of mutually beneficial trade. For example, the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has several policy goals under the 
EPAct. Most importantly, the EPAct strengthens FERC's ability to regulate the energy 
industry. FERC asserts that "effective regulation is necessary to protect the consumer 
from exploitation and assure fair competition."76 Although regulations may be well 
intended to protect consumers, regulations nearly always undermine competitive markets. 
Regulations are imposed specifically to limit markets to the firms that the regulators 
prefer. Sometimes the regulators' preferred firms make consumers better off, but often 
regulations can make consumers worse off by restricting who can enter markets. 
When government policies and regulations restrict market entry, competitive 
pressures are lessened. Competition in markets tends to push price closer to the marginal 
cost of production. In a perfectly competitive market, any one company must take the 
price determined in that market as given; otherwise customers will go elsewhere and the 
company will go out of business. With restricted entry and less competition, companies 
can earn higher-than-normal profits because they can limit output below the competitive 
level and set their prices higher.77  
Under restricted markets, consumers still benefit from exchange, but the size of 
the benefit is smaller than it would have been if entry and exit had truly been free. 
Potential competitors who did not receive government privileges miss out on the benefits 
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from exchange with willing buyers. The gains that privileged companies receive are 
smaller than the overall losses that consumers and potential competitors bear. Therefore, 
society is worse off under restricted market entry than under competitive markets.78  
One of the negative consequences of providing subsidies, loan guarantees, and 
restricted market entry is that privileged companies will lobby politicians to continue 
their privileges. This process of seeking after government favors is called "rent seeking." 
Many companies are eager to invest time and money into rent seeking to gain or maintain 
special privileges. These companies can persuade policymakers several ways. First, they 
often donate to political campaigns and political action committees. Second, they 
advertise and campaign for public policies that benefit them. Third, they engage heavily 
in lobbying to persuade policymakers.79  
Firms who receive government privileges are less like to engage in beneficial 
innovation. Economist Chun-Lei Yang shows that the incentive to invest in research and 
development diminishes when rent seeking is more prevalent.80 Economists Stefanie 
Lenway, Randall Morck, and Bernard Yeung found that companies most actively 
engaged in lobbying often were "larger, older, less diversified, and less profitable than 
non-lobbyers.” Rent seeking appears to be a substitute for innovation and 
entrepreneurship.81  
As subsidies, loan guarantees, and restricted entry cause companies to become 
less innovative, overall economic growth generally suffers. In competitive markets, new 
companies can challenge older, less-innovative ones. New companies, not being bogged 
down by bureaucratic inefficiencies, are more likely to patent and commercialize new 
technological innovation.82  
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Government privilege often encourages companies to engage in risk-taking that 
they would have avoided if they were left alone to compete in the market. Excessive risk-
taking happens often in loan guarantee situations because a company gets to keep any 
profits, but the company is not liable for any losses, which are shifted to taxpayers. 
Engaging in risk-taking when a company is insured against loss is called “moral hazard.” 
In other words, when people know they will not bear the full costs of some action, they 
are willing to act in riskier ways.83 The Solyndra scandal is a prime example of moral 
hazard.  
When politically connected companies receive government privileges, labor and 
capital allocations are not based on market-determined fundamentals. These allocations 
instead are based on political considerations that benefit politicians, bureaucrats, and the 
politically connected companies. These misallocations are problematic because they 
distort the flow of labor and capital to the places where they are most highly valued.84 
Markets provide the feedback mechanism for people to communicate what they value, 
and based on the feedback producers respond by using labor and capital in the most 
efficient combinations available. Government-caused market distortions muffle the 
feedback mechanism, causing labor and capital to flow towards lower-valued uses. 
Case Study: Energy Policy Act of 2005 
Subsidies for Fossil Fuels under the Energy Policy Act 
Under the Energy Policy Act (EPAct) of 2005, the fossil fuel industry has 
received billions of dollars in subsidies, most notably for development of “clean coal” 
technology. The law established tax credits (a form of subsidy) for investments in clean 
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coal facilities, such as a 20 percent credit for integrated gasification combined cycle 
(IGCC) projects. Rather than burning coal directly, the expensive IGCC process breaks 
coal down into its chemical constituents and collects each byproduct (carbon dioxide, 
sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, trace metals, and particulates) for filtering or treatment 
before combustion.85 Many in the environmental movement saw these subsidies a sly 
move by the coal industry to acquire government money by claiming that coal can be part 
of a more environmentally friendly energy future. 
Politically connected fossil fuel companies have been able to exploit the EPAct's 
subsidies since its enactment. Then-House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (D-TX) included 
hundreds of millions of dollars in subsidies for companies in his district to which he had 
direct ties. DeLay added $500 million in subsidies over 10 years to the bill for research 
into deep-water oil and gas drilling. Much of this grant went to the Texas Energy Center 
in DeLay's hometown of Sugar Land, Texas.86 Title IX, Subtitle J of the EPAct allows 
the government to contract with "a corporation that is structured as a consortium to 
administer the programmatic activities" for deep-water drilling.87 The “program 
consortium” has the power to allocate taxpayer money to participating corporations. The 
Research Partnership to Secure Energy for America (RPSEA) is the program consortium 
for Subtitle J of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.88 The Texas Energy Center is one of the 
members of the RPSEA.89 Six executives of the Texas Energy Center have strong ties to 
Tom DeLay, donating thousands of dollars to DeLay’s campaign since March 2004.90 
In the 1990s, Alaska Senator Frank Murkowski persuaded Congress to allocate 
$117 million to a clean coal plant in Healy, Alaska. After a potential buyer called the coal 
plant "fatally flawed by faulty design and unproven experimental technology," the plant 
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was abandoned. Murkowski's daughter, Senator Lisa Murkowski, used the EPAct of 2005 
to allocate an additional $80 million in loan guarantees to revive her father's clean coal 
plant.91  
Renewable Energy Subsidies under the Energy Policy Act 
A variety of renewable energy sources received billions in subsidies from the 
EPAct of 2005. The act extended the Production Tax Credit (PTC), which guarantees a 
per-kilowatt subsidy for most new renewable energy facilities. The law extended these 
subsidies until 2007. The EPAct also created a 30 percent tax credit for the purchase of 
residential solar water heating, photovoltaic equipment, and fuel cell equipment, as well 
as tax incentives for the construction of geothermal facilities, all through 2007.92 The 
PTC has expired several times since 2007, and Congress has repeatedly renewed it. In 
December 2015, the Consolidated Appropriations Act renewed the PTC until the end of 
December 2019 for wind facilities. The Consolidated Appropriations Act also extended 
the tax credit for other eligible renewable energy sources until the end of December 
2016.93 
Despite these subsidies, advocates of renewable energy were unconvinced that 
renewable energy had been given enough support by the EPAct. Although the law 
awarded $6.4 billion in subsidies and incentives for renewable energy, it also included 
$25 billion for oil, gas, coal, and nuclear plants.94 The Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers issued a report on the effects of the EPAct on renewable energy, 
stating that the level of subsidies provided to renewable energy in the bill would have 
little impact on the amount of renewable energy produced in the United States.95  
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Because many renewable energy sources do not produce electricity consistently or 
efficiently, renewable energy industries have become dependent on government 
assistance. Continually extending the PTC and other subsidies implies that federal 
policymakers do not perceive that the wind and solar industry can be economically self-
sustaining. Renewable energy industries also have a strong incentive to continue lobbying 
and rent-seeking for subsidies, regardless if renewable energy becomes more efficient, 
consistent, or economically viable. Despite the financial stability of the fossil fuel 
industry, the fossil fuel industry still receives government assistance and has for decades. 
The renewable energy industry likely will follow the same course. 
The Energy Policy Act's Exemptions for Fracking 
Cronyism and political connections allowed the oil and gas industry to secure 
special fracking exemptions from the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) under the EPAct 
of 2005. The explicit SDWA exemption for fracking wells resulted from an Alabama 
court case in the 1990s. The Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation (LEAF) 
claimed that Alabama's Underground Injection Control (UIC) program did not regulate 
natural gas production. In 1997, the 11th Circuit Court ruled that the EPA, through the 
SDWA, had authority to regulate fracking wells in Alabama. To bypass EPA oversight, 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 modified the definition of “underground injection” in the 
SDWA to exclude fracking fluids and other fracking materials. The EPA could regulate 
fracking injections only when diesel fuels were used in the injections.96 The EPAct 
changed the scope of the Safe Drinking Water Act so that federal agencies have a limited 
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role in regulating fracking, but most state governments have robust regulations for nearly 
every facet of the fracking process. 
The oil and gas industry lobbied heavily for exempting fracking from the SDWA. 
Politicians clearly included the fracking exemptions in the EPAct, not because of reason 
and science in federal regulation, but because of the profit interests of oil and gas 
companies. In January 2001, President Bush appointed the National Energy Policy 
Development Group, which was to serve as a task force for energy policy. Vice President 
Cheney served as the head of the group. In May 2001, Cheney's task force recommended 
that any new energy policy law should exempt fracking from the SDWA.97 Cheney and 
the other task force members held at least 40 meetings with interest groups while 
preparing recommendations for federal energy policy. Most of the initial meetings were 
between the task force and special interest groups mostly representing energy industries. 
The task force largely had completed the initial drafts of its report and already had 
briefed President Bush by the time they began meeting with environmental groups, 
according to a former White House official.98 
In October 1995, Cheney became president and chief executive officer of the 
Halliburton Company in Dallas, Texas, which is one of the largest energy companies in 
the world.99 Cheney plainly had a direct financial interest in making sure that government 
intervention in the oil and gas industry was as minimal as possible. The EPAct became a 
cronyistic political tool to grant special privileges to certain industries for people in 
power. 
Following the EPAct's revised fracking regulations, the number of well permits in 
coalbed methane basins increased. It is not clear whether, or by how much, the number of 
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wells, the production costs, or the time required by operators may have been different 
without the revisions. For the oil and gas industry, regulation of hydraulic fracturing 
under the UIC program could have many negative impacts. In some states, oil and gas 
operations are subject to regulation by a state oil and gas agency or commission as well 
as an environmental or public health agency. States and industry representatives have 
warned about the potential for duplication of requirements from having both state oil and 
gas regulations and UIC regulations. Bureaucratic delays in issuing permits and the 
resulting slowdowns in well stimulation may also be a problem. IHS Global Insight, an 
economics consulting organization, analyzed the economic and energy effects of 
potential regulation. The analysis noted that "there will be a reduction in the number of 
wells completed each year due to increased regulation and its impact on the additional 
time needed to file permits, push-back of drilling schedules due to higher costs, increased 
chance of litigation, injunction or other delay tactics used by opposing groups and 
availability of fracturing monitoring services.”100 
Furthermore, even though contamination incidents are infrequent, water cleanup 
from contamination is very expensive and would impose large costs on the oil and gas 
industry. 101 Despite the small number of incidents, the threat of high costs has given the 
oil and gas industry the incentive to block comprehensive hydraulic fracking regulation.  
One of fracking's largest problems is that many states do not require water testing 
prior to fracking operations, which makes accusations of drinking water contamination 
difficult to validate. Without an established baseline of water quality beforehand, it is 
unclear whether pollutants in the water were caused by fracking, natural sources of 
groundwater pollution, or human activities other than fracking operations. Contaminants 
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commonly attributed to fracking operations, like methane, can enter groundwater through 
natural sources, such as biogenic methane from the breakdown of organic materials, or 
methane that has been rising to the surface for millions of years.102  
Several congressmen have introduced bills to expand federal regulation of 
hydraulic fracturing activities. Senator Robert Casey (D-PA) and Representative Diana 
DeGette (D-CO) sponsored the Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals 
Act of 2015 (FRAC Act) in the Senate and the House, respectively.103,104 The bill 
proposes to amend the SDWA in several ways to enact more stringent federal oversight 
on fracking. First, the bill requires oil and gas operators to report on the chemicals used in 
the fracturing process. Second, the bill would repeal the fracking exemptions in Energy 
Policy Act of 2005. Third, the bill would authorize the EPA to regulate fracking under 
the SDWA by amending the definition of “underground injection” to include fracking 
operations.105  
Representative Janice Schakowsky (D-IL) introduced the Safe Hydration is an 
American Right in Energy Development (SHARED) Act to require baseline and follow-
up testing of potable groundwater in the vicinity of fracking operations.106 The SHARED 
Act would amend the SDWA to prohibit fracking unless an oil or gas company agrees to 
test and report water quality. The SHARED Act would also require water quality testing 
before, during, and after fracking operations. Under the bill's provisions, the EPA would 
post all test results publicly on its website. 107 
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BUREAUCRACIES AND RULEMAKING 
Regulation-Making Process 
Like legislators, regulators are rationally self-interested individuals who try to 
maximize budgets and power. Regulators impose regulations for two reasons. One, 
industry leaders may actively seek regulations because they stand to benefit from them. 
Two, regulators may impose regulations on industry against the industry leaders' wishes. 
George Stigler asserts that the driving force for regulation is that industries seek 
regulations for their own benefit. Stigler proposed that "every industry or occupation that 
has enough political power to utilize the state will seek to control entry."108 This process 
is called regulatory capture.  
The lawmaking process often maximizes the benefit to legislators and their allies. 
Federal legislators often draft environmental laws vaguely and passed them quickly to 
give the public the perception that they were “doing something” to protect the 
environment. Under these circumstances, bureaucrats in federal agencies have wide 
discretion in deciding how to implement the laws. Often, bureaucrats have more power 
than legislators in determining the actual outcomes of environmental laws. The more 
vaguely legislators write laws, the more discretion bureaucrats have to interpret the law. 
The bureaucratic implementation of laws is called rulemaking. 
In the rulemaking process, bureaucracies exhibit two common problems. First, 
bureaucracies typically gather inadequate evidence to justify the merits of a proposed 
rule. Second, bureaucracies often lack a coherent theory as to why a rule is necessary or 
appropriate. Timothy J. Muris, former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, has 
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said that deciding to regulate can be distilled down to three fundamental questions. First, 
is the issue serious enough to warrant a one-size-fits-all rule? Second, will the proposed 
rule actually address a supposed market failure? Third, what are the costs associated with 
the proposed rule in terms of time, money, and opportunity? Without clear evidence and 
coherent theories to answer these questions sufficiently, a bureaucracy cannot believably 
demonstrate that it is qualified to resolve issues with a nationwide rule.109  
Often, the bureaucratic rulemaking process begins without a clear statement of 
why an observed action violates a law and without a well-formed theory as to why a 
regulation will solve a problem better than will market forces. Even when bureaucracies 
try to gather evidence and form theories based on that evidence, the evidence often is 
incomplete or dubious. Bureaucrats rely on anecdotes, internal agency expertise, and the 
testimony of experts, but these types of evidence rarely can be tested. Imposing an 
untested theory on an entire country is likely to be risky at best, immoral at worst.110  
Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) is one of the standard tests bureaucrats adopt when 
making rules and regulations. Regulatory reformers are not pushing the use of BCAs in 
every government agency to promote the usefulness of federal lifesaving regulations. 
These reformers seek regulatory policies that will protect against risk at lower costs to 
both the private and public sectors. Although deregulation is a viable option to eliminate 
the unintended consequences that arise from rules and regulations, "smarter" regulation is 
probably a more politically viable option than the outright removal of regulations. BCA is 
helpful because it allows legislators and bureaucrats to distinguish effective or efficient 
rules from ineffective and inefficient ones. BCA will be useful only if the analyses are 
conducted and interpreted appropriately. 111 The Office of Information and Regulatory 
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Affairs (OIRA), in the Office of Management and Budget, is responsible for reviewing 
all “major” Executive Branch regulations.112 Over the past several decades, OIRA has 
made BCA more common in government agencies. As time goes on, BCA will likely 
become more widespread in bureaucracies.113 
Despite the growing trend of BCA in government agencies, bureaucrats tend to 
overstate the benefits and understate the costs for any rules they promulgate. As 
rationally self-interested budget maximizers, bureaucrats are incentivized to make their 
rules seem as good as possible with the fewest costs.114 Bureaucrats are not impartial 
judges of their own rules, so BCAs may be biased to favor an agency.  
Benefit-Cost Analyses and Regulatory Impact Analyses 
Policymakers justify environmental regulations to overcome the problem of 
negative externalities that polluters impose on non-polluters. Direct government 
intervention in the form of market-based instruments, such as a pollution taxes, or in the 
form of command-and-control regulations can increase the benefits to society while 
minimizing the negative externalities. Accurate and unbiased benefit-cost analyses are 
one of the most effective ways of maximizing net benefits from environmental policies. 
In the simplest terms, benefit-cost analyses (BCA) measure how much people are willing 
to pay for a gain or to avoid a loss. BCAs help regulators to choose the option that 
maximizes the difference between benefits and costs.115  
Bureaucratically formed regulations impose costs on the public. Prices for 
consumers may rise. Workers in certain industries may earn less. Government may 
restrict privacy and personal liberty. Regulatory impact analysis (RIA) is the framework 
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that government agencies use to make the tradeoff between the benefits and the costs that 
the regulations will impose. BCAs are one of the most important parts of RIAs.116 Jerry 
Ellig, a Senior Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 
asserts that the most robust regulatory impact analyses should generally contain four 
parts. First, RIAs should examine the significance of a problem so that bureaucrats know 
the severity of that problem. Second, RIAs should look at an array of solutions that 
bureaucrats can employ. Third, RIAs should show the benefits from a particular policy, 
and contrast them to the benefits of the alternatives, which includes doing nothing. 
Fourth, RIA's should show the costs that each policy will entail, but these costs are not 
just monetary. The costs include all the sacrifices that consumers and taxpayers must bear 
if a policy is passed.117 
Regulatory impact analyses can be flawed because they often address only one 
aspect of economic and environmental considerations. To some regulators, it appears that 
many consumers are irrational because they, for example, do not adopt more energy-
efficient cars and appliances. Although some consumers may not make ideal choices 
because they lack information, agency officials often focus only on concerns that fall 
under their own purview with little consideration for other factors. In other words, 
bureaucrats act on single issues while excluding other concerns.118 
If government agencies do not conduct robust RIAs, regulators make decisions on 
good intentions, not scientific thinking. Adopting regulations without thoroughly 
knowing the costs and benefits is irresponsible because regulations affect the livelihoods 
and well-being of millions of people throughout the nation and around the world. RIAs 
are also important because they help Congress in its oversight duties. Legislators can 
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make beneficial decisions only when they have accurate information about how 
regulations are fixing problems or how alternative solutions could be fixing problems 
more effectively.119  
Academic research has shown that many agencies do not use RIAs effectively or 
do not use RIAs at all when making regulatory decisions. It appears that RIAs are used 
more as justifications for decisions that already were made, as opposed to providing 
information to help regulators make more informed decisions. The Mercatus Center has 
created a "Regulatory Report Card" to qualitatively analyze RIAs in government 
agencies. The Regulatory Report Card scores agencies and regulations based on 12 
criteria from Executive Order 12866 and OMB guidance. The Report Card shows that 
agencies often fail to provide significant evidence that would help RIAs inform decision-
making. The statistics in the Report Card suggest that agencies either do not conduct 
RIAs, or they do not document how they used RIAs in decision-making. Even if agency 
officials use RIAs when forming decisions more than the statistics suggest, then the 
agencies lack transparency when they make decisions.120  
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and other academic research 
illustrates that agencies do not complete RIAs fully, which makes many RIAs unsuitable 
for agency decisions. Each agency, however, has widely different qualities of analysis. 
The GAO studied regulation formation between 2011 and 2013, and the study found 
generally positive results for RIAs. For example, the GAO found that government 
agencies wrote a statement of purpose and provided information on benefits and costs for 
every regulation passed in this period. The GAO also found that agencies had researched 
alternatives for 81 percent of regulations, estimated costs for 97 percent of regulations, 
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and estimated benefits for 76 percent of regulations during that time. The GAO report, 
however, is less than ideal because it did not evaluate the quality of those factors. As the 
GAO admits, their report did not "evaluate the quality of the cost-benefit analysis in the 
rules. The presence of all key elements does not provide information regarding the 
quality of the analysis, nor does the absence of a key element necessarily imply a 
deficiency in a cost-benefit analysis.”121 Without evaluating the quality of the agencies' 
RIAs, the GAO's report does not accurately reflect the effectiveness or usefulness of the 
RIA process in federal agencies.122 
Federal agencies conduct less-than-ideal RIAs because of institutional 
weaknesses. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is meant to ensure 
effective regulations, but agency officials who issue the regulations have conflicting 
incentives. First, when the president chooses to prioritize a certain regulation, agency 
officials choose to skim over the analytical requirements in past executive orders to fulfill 
the president's goals. Second, OIRA review is institutionally problematic because 
administration officials evaluate the administration's own regulations, so there is little 
incentive for OIRA workers to sabotage the administration's own work. Another 
institutional problem that OIRA officials face is that agencies can appeal to the vice 
president when OIRA blocks a regulation. Thus, the OIRA administrator is incentivized 
to block a regulation only if he knows that he is likely to win the political battle within 
the administration.123  
President Clinton issued Executive Order 12866, which requires Cabinet 
departments and independent agencies to submit a cost-benefit or other type of economic 
analysis to ORIA before issuing "significant” regulations. Independent regulatory 
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agencies, which are a subset of independent agencies, are not subject to most executive 
order rulemaking requirements.124 Independent regulatory agencies include federal 
entities such as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.125 
Regulation-Making in the EPA 
The EPA, as one of the most prolific regulatory agency, has incorporated cost-
benefit analyses into its regulatory process slowly over time. The role of economics in 
environmental policymaking, however, is understudied. Fraas found that throughout the 
1980s, economics had only a minor influence on the environmental policymaking 
process, but when the EPA did engage in economic analyses, the agency made better 
regulations.126 Morgenstern also explored how economics has shaped the formation of 
environmental policies. He found that “in many instances the economic analyses played 
only a minor role in actual decision making.”127 Hahn and Dudley found that "a 
significant percentage of the analyses done by the EPA do not report some very basic 
economic information." Hahn and Dudley also found that the quality of benefit-cost 
analyses generally is low.128  
The EPA's experience with economic analysis has gone through three periods 
over the course of the agency's existence. First, in the early years of the agency, 
economics played an insignificant role in the EPA's decision-making process. Second, 
after presidents Reagan and Clinton issued Executive Orders 12291 and 12866, 
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respectively, the EPA was required to use economic analysis more robustly in the 
decision-making process. Third, the EPA currently uses economics more than it has in 
the past, but the role of economics in the EPA decision-making process has peaked and 
does not seem to be increasing.129 
After Congress created the EPA in July 1970, President Nixon combined agencies 
from across the federal government to form the new agency. The newly formed EPA 
consisted of a diverse set of professionals from a variety of fields, including law, biology, 
chemistry, and engineering. During the EPA's early years, the only economists involved 
with regulating agriculture worked in the agency’s Office of Pesticide Programs. One of 
the EPA's earliest responsibilities was implementing the Clean Air Act, which Congress 
passed the same year that the EPA was formed. The Clean Air Act was unfavorable to 
economic analysis because the law specifically disallowed the EPA from considering 
costs when setting standards regarding air quality standards. The EPA lacked economic 
guidance, and the agency used nearly no market incentives in its early years. The EPA 
employed “command and control” strategies to fulfill the mandates found in 
environmental laws like the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. The command and 
control strategies stifled innovation because the EPA often relied on standards that locked 
in current technology while disregarding new technologies that may have been more 
efficient or cost-effective.130  
Because the EPA lacked economic guidance in its early years, its policies were 
not as well informed as those of other agencies, such as the Department of Agriculture 
(USDA). In the 1970s, USDA economists crafted agricultural policies that employed 
economic analysis regarding agricultural subsidy levels, conservation reserve levels, and 
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market conditions. USDA economists were equipped with economic tools and techniques 
that helped the agency officials make policies in light of a wider set of information. More 
information allowed USDA officials to make more informed policies. In the early years 
of the EPA, however, officials neglected economic analysis, and so officials largely 
created policies by popular demand, not economic reasoning.131  
When Ronald Reagan became president, he issued Executive Order 12291, which 
required that agencies conduct a “regulatory impact analysis” for all economically 
significant EPA rules. Regulatory impact analyses included benefit-cost analyses. 
Executive Order 12291 also mandated that the EPA should select the policy option that 
maximized net benefit, as long as the law allowed it. The executive order also gave the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) the responsibility to review how well other 
agencies were complying with the executive order. Executive Order 12291 became the 
primary force for economics entering the EPA's policy-making process in the 1980s. The 
mandates for benefit-cost analyses and OMB reviews became controversial within the 
EPA and for environmentalists because they saw the analyses and reviews as a means for 
deregulation, instead of a scientific tool for better policy making. Because many people 
within the EPA and the environmental movement did not understand what benefit-cost 
analyses were, they saw the executive order as a sinister political tool, not a beneficial 
policy-making tool.132  
As the benefit-cost analysis process became more common at the EPA, many 
officials treated it as simply another box to check rather than as a way of helping to 
improve policies. During the 1980s, the EPA's major program offices, which included 
Air, Water, Waste, Toxic Substances, and Drinking Water, began employing economics 
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staffs that would conduct benefit-cost analyses. The EPA administrator and deputy 
administrator began to incorporate economics arguments into policy considerations, as 
well as arguments regarding public health, engineering, and legal precedent.133 
From the 1980s and into the 1990s, EPA officials began to consider new ways to 
incorporate economic incentives into their environmental regulations. The EPA adopted a 
“banking and trading system” for the lead phase-out program. Eileen Claussen, the 
director responsible for the stratospheric ozone program, worked to find a system for 
marketable permits to phase out chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other ozone-destroying 
chemicals. Other leaders in the EPA began to understand the political economy of market 
incentives, such as the Clean Air Act's 1990 amendments that allowed an acid rain 
trading program. Officials from the George H. W. Bush administration and policy leaders 
at the Environmental Defense Fund used market-based approaches to set up a cap-and-
trade system for sulfur dioxide emissions from coal power plants.134 
Although economics has grown in prominence during the EPA's lifetime, many 
officials still resist economic ways of thinking when approaching regulatory rule making. 
The EPA typically imposes harsher requirements for new sources of risk, such as new 
technologies and new products. For example, new pesticides that are potentially safer 
have a difficult time competing with existing pesticides because of stringent regulations. 
Or, stricter regulations on new pollution emitters prolong the lives older, dirtier polluters. 
Without economists in the EPA, differentiated regulations would likely be much 
worse.135  
Dick Morgenstern, who served as the head of the EPA's central economic/policy 
office, assessed the relative risks of all U.S. environmental problems. Many people in the 
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EPA were skeptical of Morgenstern's study, but the administrator then supported it. With 
Morgenstern's help, the EPA produced its first comparative risk assessment. This risk 
assessment became one of the agency's main factors for setting budgets and priorities. 
Other relative successes for economics at the EPA include the phase-out of many 
technological standards, the consideration of unintended consequences and improvements 
in risk assessments. Technology standards were a simple way for the EPA to regulate 
because they are easily enforceable, but EPA economists showed that such standards 
limit innovation and efficiency. Thanks to EPA economists, the agency began to employ 
more performance standards and emissions trading, rather than imposing technological 
standards. EPA economists also helped the agency to more fully appreciate the fact that 
thorough analysis before any regulation is implemented can still spawn unpredicted 
consequences. EPA economists also contributed to risk assessments that estimated 
pollution-dose response curves from cross-sectional data, which helped to combine 
environmental data with health outcomes data. Before this type of risk assessment, EPA 
risk assessors used data from animals or laboratory test chambers. Using the response 
curves, EPA economists worked with risk assessors to estimate risk reductions.136  
One of the most influential contributions made by economists to the EPA was the 
use of marginal analysis. Economists are generally trained in thinking on the margin, but 
other EPA employees who worked in law, ecology, and health sciences had little 
exposure to that way of thinking. Because costs and benefits rarely are linear, marginal 
analysis became an important way for EPA officials to make decisions when weighing 
the costs and benefits of implementing new, costly policies.137  
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Many people in and out of the EPA fear that benefit-costs analyses are the driving 
force for EPA decision-making. Benefit-cost analyses are simply one consideration for 
EPA decision makers, and decision makers often ignore economic analyses when other 
considerations are put forward. For every regulatory proposal, each EPA benefit-cost 
analysis goes out for public comment. Public comment allows other government agencies 
and the public to check the work of EPA economists.138 
Accumulation of Regulations Over Time 
Regulations typically are responses to major events, including new technology, 
scandals, and perceived crises. Congressional laws give regulatory agencies the power to 
create new rules and regulations to fix these problems, and even laws passed decades ago 
can allow regulators to create new regulations. One of the main problems with the 
regulatory process, however, is that no system-wide mechanism exists to remove old, 
redundant, or ineffective regulations from the federal code. Because no such mechanism 
exists, federal regulations accumulate over time, and as the number of regulations 
continues to grow, the regulations' effects on the economy and personal liberty also 
grow.139  
The federal government prints the Code of Federal Regulations every year. The 
code contains all of the regulations that are in effect at any given time. In 2012 alone, the 
code consisted of over 170,000 pages. The accumulation of regulations over decades has 
resulted in over one million restrictions written in legal jargon. The Code of Federal 
Regulations has more than doubled in size in the past 40 years. In 1975, the code 
contained 1,224 pages of regulations. By 2012, the number of pages had grown to 
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174,545. The number of pages may not accurately represent the actual growth in the 
number of regulations, since not all regulations are the same in quality, scope and impact. 
The number of restrictions within the code, including words such as “shall,” “must,” and 
“may not,” has grown similarly to the number of pages.140  
The constant accumulation of regulations is problematic for society in several 
ways. First, excessive regulations can hinder innovation and entrepreneurship. Second, 
over-regulation can hamper economic efficiency. By stifling innovation, 
entrepreneurship, and efficiency, regulations can lead to a lower average real household 
income nationwide. Third, regulatory accumulation can disproportionately affect low-
income households, which places the burden most heavily on the people that the 
regulations generally are trying to help. Fourth, political and public pressures can 
incentivize regulators to create regulations without proper research or create regulations 
that favor one group of people over another.141 By pushing through hastily made 
regulations, regulators can spur even more unintended consequences from their rules, 
harming even more people in the process. Also, because regulations are so difficult to 
remove once they are put in place, making regulations too quickly allows unsound or 
counterproductive regulations to exist almost indefinitely. Poorly made or rushed 
regulations may not even achieve what they were meant to achieve, but they surely will 
impose costs on taxpayers and consumers.142  
Regulations are a way that government officials change behavior to fit their 
preferences. In an expert paper from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), Dr. Cary Coglianese asserts that regulations change individual or 
organizational behavior for some sort of societal or economic improvement. In other 
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words, ideal regulations are meant to change the behavior of the entities under the 
regulations, which will lead to better outcomes by solving problems or internalizing 
externalities.143 Coglianese's assertion, however, treats regulators as benevolent and 
omniscient. Public choice theory asserts that regulators respond to incentives and try to 
maximize their own utility, like any rational self-interested actor. It is naive to assume 
that regulators will make regulations simply to change behavior that will result in better 
outcomes. If regulations actually led increasingly to better outcomes, we would not 
expect to see such drastic increases in the number of regulations over the past several 
decades.  
Federal regulations, especially environmental regulations, restrict the choices of 
individuals, which imposes costs on the market and on government itself. Regulations 
increase the time costs and monetary costs for business owners and state, local and 
federal governments to complete nearly any project. As the number of regulations 
continues to increase, the costs will almost certainly continue to increase.  
According to the OMB, the costs directly imposed on regulated entities amount to 
tens of billions of dollars each year.144 The costs alone are staggering, but the estimations 
of the supposed benefits of these regulations vary widely. Within the federal government, 
the EPA has the rules with the largest estimated benefits and the highest estimated costs. 
The EPA's Office of Air and Radiation has the largest estimates of all. Of all federal 
regulations, EPA rules make up 63 to 82 percent of the monetized benefits and 46 to 56 
percent of the monetized costs. The EPA's air rules compose 98 to 99 percent of all 
benefits from EPA rules. The estimates of monetary benefits for particular EPA rules 
vary so widely that they differ by orders of magnitude. For example, the EPA estimates 
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that the 2007 Clean Air Fine Particle Implementation Rule results in benefits ranging 
from $19 billion to $167 billion per year (in 2001 dollars). The EPA also estimates that 
the 2005 Clean Air Interstate Rule monetarily benefits the United States from $12 to 
$152 billion annually (also in 2001 dollars). The EPA estimates benefits for the 2011 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired 
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units at $28 billion to $77 billion.145 The OMB asserts 
that the benefits of these rules "far exceed the costs," but with such large variation in the 
estimates of the benefits and the difficulty in calculating all the unseen costs from market 
distortions, it is difficult to trust the assertion that the benefits far outweigh the costs. 
When benefit estimations can be inflated and indirect or hidden costs are nearly 
impossible to measure accurately, rationally self-interested regulators can make any 
regulation seem better than it actually may be. Regulators would be unwise and irrational 
to calculate that the costs outweigh the benefits for any of the regulations.  
The accumulation of regulations harms the economy because an ever growing 
body of regulations makes engaging in entrepreneurship and innovation costlier. Dr. John 
Dawson of Appalachian State University and Dr. John Seater of North Carolina State 
University found that "regulation has statistically and economically significant effects on 
aggregate output and the factors that produce it–total factor productivity, physical capital, 
and labor." They also found that regulations have reduced the growth rates of output and 
total factor productivity. Dawson and Seater also report evidence that the growth of 
regulations explains the productivity slowdown of the 1970s. 146 The study found that 
federal regulations have reduced real output growth on average by about two percentage 
points over the past fifty years, which means that the accumulated reduction in GDP 
54 
equals about $38.8 trillion as of 2011. In other words, Dawson and Seater's calculations 
showed that 2011 GDP would have been $53.9 trillion instead of $15.1 trillion if 
regulations had not increased since 1949.147 Currently in the United States, 300 million 
people living in 140 million households have lost $277,100 per household and $129,300 
per person because of the past fifty years of federal regulations.148  
Other studies corroborate Dawson's and Seater's empirical analysis. In World 
Bank Policy Research working paper, Norman Loayza, Ana Maria Oviedo, and Luis 
Serven find that a heavier regulatory burden reduces growth in both developed and 
developing countries. Especially in developing countries, the informal sector of the 
economy produces a large fraction of national wealth. More regulations promote the 
informal sector of the economy as people work to avoid regulations. Their study finds 
that more product-market or labor regulations are associated with an expansion of the 
informal, underground economy.149 The World Bank and the OECD have found that a 
larger number of regulations leads to slower economic growth.150  
Negative Effects of Regulations 
One of the main problems with growing numbers of regulations is the increase in 
"opportunity costs." Opportunity costs are the value of the next-highest-valued alternative 
use of a resource or action.151 In terms of regulations, the opportunity cost of regulations 
is the lost productivity because scarce resources have to be allocated to complying with 
regulations.152 Business owners and government officials have to spend time and money 
complying with an ever-growing list of regulatory requirements, rather than innovating, 
creating value, or seeking entrepreneurial success. Regulatory accumulation means that 
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people have higher opportunity costs because they must devote a greater fraction of their 
limited time, money, and capital to compliance instead of looking for new products that 
could make people's lives better. 
Inflexible regulations stifle innovation because they do not align with economic 
incentives. As long ago as 1991, the EPA was looking for ways to incorporate market-
oriented policies into some of its regulations to limit the negative effects of regulations. 
EPA Administrator William K. Reilly established an Economic Incentives Task Force to 
research potential ways to incorporate market-oriented policies into the EPA’s regulatory 
processes. Amendments to the Clean Air Act in the early 1990s included a tradable 
permit system for acid rain control, which was a more market-based approach than the 
EPA had used previously. Market-oriented environmental policies are drastically 
different from the command-and-control approaches that the EPA had used since it was 
first established in the 1970s. Despite steps forward, the EPA still issues many 
regulations that mandate uniform technologies or performance standards, which lack 
flexibility or incentives to innovate better technology.153 In addition, market-based 
policies like trading systems do not necessarily mean that the desired outcome will come 
about. Aligning economic incentives with environmental regulations is simple in theory, 
but much more difficult actually to achieve in practice. Future policymakers will need to 
allow economists to expand techniques that can align economic and environmental 
benefits more closely. Incentive-based instruments likely will improve environmental 
regulations because they require less administrative expertise and fewer resources.154  
Regulations are often regressive, meaning that the burden of the regulation 
disproportionately falls on people of lower incomes.155 Regulations force producers to 
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incur greater costs, and those costs are often passed onto the consumers as higher prices 
for goods and services. Producers spend billions of dollars each year to comply with 
regulations that are meant to mitigate risks from pollution and other environmental 
degradation. Evidence shows that many high-income households prefer regulations that 
reduce low-probability risks with higher costs. In essence, these regulations redistribute 
wealth from the lower-income groups to higher-income in return for only marginal 
benefits.156  
Case Study: Wilderness Designations in National Parks 
The Wilderness Act and the National Park Service Organic Act of 1916 are both 
meant to preserve land, but the National Park Service (NPS) has turned to wilderness 
designations within national parks as a way to lock in current management preferences. 
This process makes wilderness designations in national parks both redundant and a 
political tool for national park managers to ensure that future managers cannot override 
current managers' preferences. 
 Both the Organic Act of 1916, which established the NPS, and the Wilderness 
Act require land managers to protect federal land in a way that leaves it available for the 
use of future generations. The 1916 Organic Act states that the NPS must "provide for the 
enjoyment of the [parks, monuments, and reservations] in such manner and by such 
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”157 The 
Wilderness Act states that wilderness must be “administered for the use and enjoyment of 
the American people in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and 
enjoyment as wilderness.”158 Although the wording of the two acts implies that the intent 
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of both laws is to preserve the land for future use, the management policies of the NPS 
are different than the management practices of wilderness management agencies. 
The 1916 Organic Act allows the Secretary of the Interior to engage in active 
management to protect national parks. The Secretary of the Interior can permit logging in 
national parks to control invasive species and protect the condition of the park. The 
secretary can also do what she sees fit in providing for the preservation of native plant 
and animal life. The 1916 Organic Act of requires the secretary to accommodate visitors 
to parks, national monuments, and reservations managed by the NPS.159 In comparison, 
the Wilderness Act restricts any commercial enterprise (which includes logging) within 
wilderness areas unless a mining or grazing claim existed on the land prior to the 
wilderness designation. Under the 1964 Wilderness Act, wilderness management 
agencies are not required to provide any special accommodations for those with 
disabilities.160  
NPS officials in specific national parks sometimes lobby Congress to designate 
wilderness areas within national parks. The designation of wilderness in national parks is 
inherently contradictory because of the different purposes of wilderness land and national 
parks. While the Organic Act explicitly states that park managers must accommodate 
visitors to the park, the Wilderness Act was designed largely to limit human activity 
within wilderness. National parks already are one of the most heavily protected forms of 
federal lands. NPS managers have complete authority to develop, or not develop, national 
park land as they see fit. In practical terms, the difference between the protection 
provided by a national park designation and a wilderness designation is minimal at best. 
Wilderness designations within national parks essentially are superfluous.  
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The NPS asserts that wilderness designation is necessary in national parks 
because “[n]ational park backcountry is protected only by administrative regulations that 
agency officials can change."161 Implicitly, NPS officials fear that future park managers 
and officials will undermine the conservation principles that current NPS officials 
employ, so wilderness designations within parks are a strategic tool to limit the power of 
future NPS managers. Wilderness designations within parks allow present managers to 
ensure that their preferences for the park last indefinitely. In essence, current park 
managers can use wilderness designations to impose their preferences and management 
styles on future NPS managers by using the most stringent land policy in the United 
States to restrict future development. 
Designating wilderness in national parks is not only superfluous; it is also 
inconsistent between national parks. Some major national parks, like Yellowstone 
National Park, Grand Canyon National Park, and Glacier National Park, do not have 
designated wilderness lands within them, but they nevertheless are some of the most 
highly protected and undeveloped land in the United States. Other national parks, like 
Yosemite National Park and Mount Rainier National Park, contain official wilderness 
areas. Yellowstone and Glacier National Parks are not any less wild than Yosemite and 
Mount Rainier National Parks, yet the latter are protected by additional laws. 
Undeveloped lands in non-wilderness national parks are not in any danger of being 
developed because NPS officials have no disposition or incentive to develop wild land. 
The potential for public backlash also protects land in non-wilderness national parks from 
being developed. The uneven distribution of wilderness designations among national 
parks illustrates that wilderness designations are used as a tool for park managers to 
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ensure that land remains in its current states, furthering their own interests. Wilderness 
designations in national parks create legislative and judicial burdens that may discourage 
future NPS managers from taking necessary actions to maintain national park land.  
HOW NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES ARISE 
Unintended Consequences 
Policymakers and economists often have a difficult time foreseeing what the 
effects of any law will be. Many laws are rooted in noble intentions, but the actual 
application of the laws and the political process can alter the law so that unforeseen 
outcomes arise. Frederic Bastiat, a French economist in the 19th century, was one of the 
first theorists to publish the concept of unintended consequences. In his work "The Seen 
and the Unseen," Bastiat describes how all laws spark a series of effects. He says, "There 
is only one difference between a bad economist and a good one: the bad economist 
confines himself to the visible effect; the good economist takes into account both the 
effect that can be seen and those effects that must be foreseen."162  
Government officials do not and cannot have sufficient information to accurately 
plan complex economic or political systems, and their lack of knowledge allows negative 
consequences to arise that they may not have foreseen. Friedrich Hayek, in his essay 
"The Use of Knowledge in Society," asserts that there are two types of planning: 
centralized and decentralized. Centralized planning occurs when a small number of 
legislators or bureaucrats dictate the solutions to problems and use the government's 
authority to make others comply with their system of solutions. Decentralized planning 
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occurs when many people voluntarily cooperate to find solutions to problems without any 
coordinating force.163  
Government officials may genuinely try to find the best solution by using the best 
scientific knowledge and expert opinions. Even aided by the most knowledgeable 
experts, they cannot know the specific details about every situation in every time and 
every place. Because it is impossible for government officials to gather and process all 
relevant information or foresee all possible outcomes, unintended consequences easily 
arise from even the most well-intentioned policies. Decentralized planning, on the other 
hand, takes advantage of the collective knowledge of people in a society.164 Decentralized 
planning is not perfect, but it allows individuals to respond to changing incentives.  
Intended Consequences 
Although lawmakers and regulators may not be able to foresee every outcome 
from environmental laws, outcomes that are negative for society may be beneficial for a 
small group of influential people, and negative outcomes may be too costly for 
policymakers to avoid. The benefits to interest groups are concentrated, so they have a 
strong financial incentive to continue lobbying policymakers to keep socially negative 
laws on the books. The costs, however, are dispersed among the whole population, so 
fighting against preferential treatment to a small group would cost any one person more 
than the costs they individually incur.165 
Special interest groups seek for preferential treatment, and lawmakers often 
oblige when they can reap benefits from the industries while not upsetting their 
constituency. The political exchange of favors between lawmakers and special interest 
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group leaders may intentionally enact laws with net negative social effects as long as the 
costs are dispersed over a sufficiently large number of people. Therefore, negative 
consequences may be intended when politicians strategically use them as a means of 
political exchange.166 The combination of purely unintended consequences and 
strategically designed political exchange can result in policies that generate socially 
negative outcomes. 
Case Study: Bark Beetles in Wilderness Areas 
The Wilderness Act can prevent land managers from preserving environmental 
quality in wilderness areas because they are limited in how much beneficial active 
management in which they can engage. The Wilderness Act requires that wilderness land 
must “[retain] its primeval character and influence,” so wilderness land managers in the 
U.S. Forest Service, National Park Service, Bureau of Land Management, and the Fish 
and Wildlife Service can do very little to improve the quality of wilderness land. The 
Wilderness Act restricts logging and prescribed burns in wilderness areas, causing forests 
in wilderness to become densely overgrown. Although the Wilderness Act was meant to 
preserve environmental quality, the unmanaged state of wilderness forests makes them 
particularly susceptible to pest infestation and overwhelming forest fires, negating the 
purpose of the law. 
Bark beetles burrow into trees in the summer and fall, lay eggs, and then move 
onto new trees. When the eggs hatch, the larvae tunnel out of the trees, limiting nutrient 
flow and killing the trees.167 When trees die due to beetles, they dry out and provide 
prime fuel for wildfires. Beetles spread more easily in dense wilderness forests than in 
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managed forests, but the Wilderness Act severely limits active management on 
wilderness land. 
In 1986, Louisiana’s Kisatchie Hills Wilderness suffered an infestation of the 
Southern Pine Beetle, killing approximately 3900 acres, or 45 percent of the wilderness 
area. The wilderness managers felled trees around the wilderness boundaries to prevent 
the bark beetles from traveling farther into the forest, but they did not engage in active 
management inside the boundaries. In 1987, lightning ignited a wildfire that burned 7500 
acres, which became the largest wildfire in Louisiana’s history. The beetle-killed wood 
exacerbated the severity of the fire, which may have been lessened if active management 
were allowed.168  
As of 2013, a Mountain Pine Beetle epidemic has killed 90 percent of the trees in 
the Black Elk Wilderness in South Dakota.169 Since the infestation began, the U.S. Forest 
Service has issued commercial logging contracts for areas outside the wilderness to help 
control the spread of the beetles. Logging and thinning reduces the risk of further 
infestation, but the wilderness designation has stopped abatement techniques within the 
boundaries, causing more die-offs.170  
Case Study: The Clean Air Act and Pollution Exports 
Rather than cleaning up industrial processes, the Clean Air Act (CAA) has 
incentivized many industries to export sources of pollution to countries that have not 
enacted strict environmental laws. Instead of actually cleaning the air, the CAA has made 
pollution more of a problem for less developed countries. The Clean Air Act raises 
manufacturing costs in the United States for many companies, contributing to the exodus 
63 
of manufacturing jobs. In 1970, nearly 18 million Americans, or 8.8 percent of the 
population, were employed in manufacturing jobs.171 Today, only 12 million Americans, 
3.7 percent of the population, work in manufacturing.  
 The CAA has shifted the locations from which we purchase manufactured goods. 
Many of the manufacturing jobs lost in the United States have moved to low-wage 
countries with less stringent environmental laws in the past forty years.172 Between 1999 
and 2008, American multinational companies created 2.4 million jobs abroad, while 
reducing their domestic workforce by 1.9 million jobs.173 During this same time, air 
pollution has been increasing in poorer parts of the world.174 The Blacksmith Institute, a 
nonprofit that focuses on pollution in developing countries, estimates that more than 4.5 
million people die each year from indoor and urban air pollution in less developed 
countries.175 
 Although cheaper labor is a driving force for the manufacturing shift, the cost of 
compliance with National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) issued by the EPA 
also raises costs that help drive manufacturing overseas. Manufacturers estimate that they 
spend upwards of $30 billion every year just to comply with environmental regulations 
imposed by the federal government.176 Finding better ways of keeping and reducing 
pollution at home would reduce net global emissions, rather than exporting it to nations 
less capable of handling the damaging effects. 
Case Study: Picking Winners and Losers in the Clean Air Act 
The CAA has been counterproductive to its original intent by protecting some of 
the oldest, dirtiest coal plants with the provisions included in Section 111 of the law. Coal 
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power plants that should have been closed years ago have continued to operate because 
the CAA prevents competitors from replacing them. Federal standards for new stationary 
sources of pollution are stricter than state standards in many cases, providing existing 
polluters with a market advantage. 
 The average lifespan of a coal power plant is approximately forty years, but more 
than fifty percent of the 1400 operating coal plants in the country were built in 1970 or 
earlier.177,178 Because the CAA raises costs for new coal plants, many coal power plants 
have not been retired, and the United States has seen a reduction in the number of new 
coal power plants since the 1980s, indicating the prohibitively high costs associated with 
CAA compliance. 
The CAA also has been economically harmful because it has taken from many 
Americans the ability to find work in counties or areas that have been designated as 
“nonattainment areas.” Under the CAA, nonattainment areas are locations that do not 
meet the EPA’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards. In an article published in the 
Journal of Political Economy, Michael Greenstone finds that the costs companies incur 
from being located in a nonattainment area have an impact on employment and capital 
accumulation. Greenstone concludes that over a fifteen-year period, the EPA standards 
for the Clean Air Act were responsible for over 590,000 lost jobs and more than $100 
billion in reduced output.179 Nonattainment designations also punish people in economies 
who cannot reasonably afford cleaner energy. Poorer economies based in dirtier 
industries disproportionately bear the burden of nonattainment punishments, and the 
CAA will likely continue to harm America’s poorest communities economically. 
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Case Study: Bureaucratic Growth from the Clean Air Act 
 The CAA has allowed the EPA to grow over the last few decades, which has 
increased costs for taxpayers and reduced economic in return for only marginal benefits. 
In 2004, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts sued the EPA for declining to regulate 
greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide.180 The case eventually reached the Supreme 
Court, which determined that the CAA’s broad language permitted the EPA to regulate 
carbon dioxide. The Supreme Court required the EPA to determine alternative measures 
for greenhouse gas emissions.181 The EPA’s greater authority to regulate carbon dioxide 
will continue to expand the EPA’s control of nearly every industry in the United States.  
 Despite huge declines in air pollution, the EPA’s budget continues to rise 
unnecessarily. According to the EPA’s own statistics, nearly the entire country is now in 
compliance with the majority of air quality standards. Concentration levels for criteria 
pollutants have fallen by an average of 50 percent and have all attained the national 
standard goals.182  
 Each year, the EPA receives increased funding to improve air quality, despite 
achieving national standards and having fewer nonattainment areas to regulate. Total 
resources for regulating air quality increased by approximately 10.8 percent in fiscal year 
2016, with most of this increase coming from additional money for addressing climate 
change.183 
 As with all bureaucracies, the EPA’s leadership continues to search for ways to 
expand its budget and secure additional responsibilities. Since the creation of the EPA in 
1970, the annual budget has grown from $1 billion to $8.59 billion for 2016.184 Adjusted 
for inflation, this represents a forty percent increase in spending, despite the fact that 
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nearly all stationary polluters are compliant with air quality standards and automobile 
emissions are down 90 percent since the CAA was passed. 185 
Case Study: NEPA's Time Constraint & Delays 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires all federal agencies to 
research and analyze environmental impacts from any government project. As NEPA 
compliance has become increasingly complex and meticulous, the amount time required 
to file Environmental Assessments (EAs) and Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) 
has increased steadily, imposing higher costs on taxpayers with minimal benefits.  
Current Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) guidance recommends that a 
typical EA be between 10 and 15 pages in length, but the CEQ found that nearly two-
thirds of 41 surveyed agencies exceed the 15-page ceiling.186 The CEQ expects EISs to 
be between 150 and 300 pages, depending on the project’s complexity and scope.187 
According to a study completed by Cambridge University, which analyzed 2,236 final 
EISs completed between 1998 and 2006, “the time [required] to prepare an EIS ranged 
from 51 days to 6,708 days (18.4 years).”188 In April 2013, the National Association of 
Environmental Professionals (NAEP) reported that the average preparation time for final 
EISs in 2012 was 1,675 days, or 4.6 years.189 The NAEP also found that from 2000 to 
2012, the average preparation time for all government-wide EIS completion “increased at 
an average rate of 34.2 days per year.”190 The U.S. Department of Transportation 
reported that the average time elapsed between a Notice of Intent and a Record of 
Decision is 67 months.191 The constant threat of litigation has incentivized agencies to 
invest large amounts of time and money in over-preparing EISs to “insulate them from 
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judicial challenge.”192 The sheer time commitment for adequately completing an EIS, 
coupled with possible litigation delays, can drag out a project’s potential approval for 
more than a decade.  
The case of Atlas Minerals’ tailings disposal shows how the NEPA process can 
needlessly waste millions of dollars and decades of time to reach a simple decision. In 
1986, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued an EA for Atlas Minerals’ 
uranium waste disposal plan. The radioactive waste was located on a floodplain of the 
Colorado River in Moab, Utah, which provides drinking water for massive cities such as 
San Diego and Los Angeles. In 1993, the NRC issued a “Findings of No Significant 
Impact” (FONSI), allowing Atlas Minerals to cap its tailings pile without relocating the 
waste away from the Colorado River.193  
Following local opposition, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) requested that the NRC 
prepare an EIS regarding disposal alternatives. The EIS only considered capping the 
tailings where they were currently located, which was exactly the same solution 
recommended in the previously prepared EA. The NRC asserted that water contamination 
was unlikely. Following the issuance of the final EIS, multiple agencies and laboratories 
found dangerous levels of contamination in the water near the tailings pile.194  
Atlas filed for bankruptcy after spending hundreds of millions to stabilize the 
material or move it to a safer location.195 Following Atlas’s bankruptcy, the DOE became 
responsible for disposal of the uranium tailings. The DOE leaders decided to conduct a 
new, more comprehensive EIS. In September 2005, after 19 years of debate, a record of 
decisions was issued, stating that the 12 million tons of tailings would be transported 30 
miles by train to Crescent Junction, Utah.196  
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Case Study: Incentive to Litigate under NEPA 
 Litigating against NEPA compliance allows individuals and special interest 
groups to hinder governmental action. Because litigation is costly and time-consuming, 
government agencies over-prepare EISs to protect against litigation, which adds 
unnecessary time and money costs to the NEPA process. Approximately 100 NEPA-
related lawsuits are filed each year, and the government prevails in the vast majority of 
cases.197 The GAO stated, “Although the number of NEPA lawsuits is relatively small 
when compared with the total number of NEPA analyses, one lawsuit can affect 
numerous federal decisions or actions in several states, having a far-reaching impact.”198 
The Department of Justice estimates that plaintiffs’ attorney fees paid between 2009 and 
2013 exceeded $22 million, but due to incomplete information, the House Committee on 
Natural Resources believes “the numbers are likely much higher.”199 According to ex-
NEPA practitioner, Alan Harwood, “The threat of litigation under NEPA is entirely too 
pervasive. Too often the NEPA process is used as a threat by community groups to fight 
or block projects they don’t like - even if there is widespread but less vocal support for 
the project.”200 Plaintiffs in these litigations are most often environmental groups and 
citizens groups.201  
Federal agencies prevailed in 86 percent of NEPA-related litigations in 2012, 
which were held in a court of appeals.202 Plaintiffs understand the small likelihood of a 
victory in court, and often use NEPA litigation simply as a tool to block projects that 
might be environmentally damaging203  
 For example, on May 14, 2012, the Quechan Tribe of Arizona’s Fort Yuma Indian 
Reservation sued the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) over NEPA compliance for 
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approving the Ocotillo Wind Energy Facility Project. According to the Quechan Tribe, 
the BLM failed to consider the tribe’s concerns about building the large wind farm on top 
of sacred land. After nearly a year of litigation, the court ruled in favor of the BLM, 
stating that the BLM made “many attempts, starting regularly in 2010” to meet with the 
tribe and modify the wind project around the tribe’s concerns. The BLM made significant 
effort during the development stages of the project to incorporate the Quechan Tribe’s 
concerns about the project’s design, and adequately complied with NEPA’s regulations. 
The case delayed the Ocotillo Wind Project for nearly a year, and did little more than 
waste time and money for both parties involved.204,205  
 To avoid wasteful court time and legal fees, agencies over-prepare EAs and EISs 
by compiling as much information as possible to protect against litigation, which incurs 
huge costs in both time and money. The GAO stated that this incentive for agencies to 
produce “litigation-proof EIS[s]... may lead to an increase in the cost and time needed to 
complete NEPA analyses but not necessarily to an improvement in the quality of the 
documents ultimately produced.”206  
Case Study: Lack of Cost-tracking Mechanisms in NEPA 
NEPA lacks any cost-tracking mechanisms, which makes monitoring agencies’ 
difficult and cost-benefit analyses nearly impossible. A report published by the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated, “Little information exists on the costs 
and benefits of completing NEPA analyses. Agencies do not routinely track the cost of 
completing NEPA analyses, and there is no government-wide mechanism to do so.”207 
Data compiled by the National Association of Environmental Professionals (NAEP), as 
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well as a study conducted by Cambridge University, show that the cost and time required 
to comply with NEPA has been rising steadily since the law’s passage, but no 
comprehensive financial data exist.208,209 NEPA’s expensive inefficiencies largely have 
been ignored by lawmakers because no government-wide, quantifiable data are available. 
Until government-wide cost-tracking measures are implemented, the costs associated 
with NEPA compliance will continue to be overlooked, and the law’s blatant 
inefficiencies will continue to grow.  
Case Study: Unintended Consequences of Energy Efficiency Policies 
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) was meant to promote energy efficiency 
and reduce energy consumption, but due to the “rebound effect,” energy consumption 
actually increases in some cases. More efficient appliances require less energy per unit of 
“service”, and so in theory, consumers should use less energy. The basic laws of supply 
and demand, however, show that people use services more, rather than continue to 
consume the same amount, when services become cheaper. Consumers have less of an 
incentive to use services frugally, and end up using more services than before. This 
“rebound effect” negates some, or even all, of the energy savings from using energy-
efficient appliances.210 The rebound effect has negated much of the energy savings of the 
EPAct’s energy-efficiency provisions. The AEEE estimated that the EPAct’s energy 
efficiency provisions lowered U.S. energy consumption by 1.5 percent in 2005, but this 
estimate did not account for the rebound effect.  
When energy is cheap, people use more of it, and when energy is expensive, 
people use less of it. Reducing energy costs and increasing energy efficiency incentivizes 
71 
large amounts of energy consumption, which offsets any gains from greater energy 
efficiency. 
Rebound estimates vary widely, depending on factors such as the energy-saving 
device or system being assessed, and the region and wealth of the people studied.211 Dr. 
Steve Sorrell of the University of Sussex conducted a meta-analysis of rebounds 
associated with more efficient electric heating and found a range of savings between 10 
and 58 percent in the short run and 1.4 to 60 percent in the long.212 One study of Sweden 
estimated that 20 percent of the improvements in the efficiency of personal transport and 
space heating would bring backfires of 120 and 170 percent of the saved energy.213 The 
American Council for An Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE) estimated the energy 
savings caused by the EPAct of 2005, but did not account for rebounds in the 
calculations. The ACEEE’s modest estimate of 1.5 percent energy savings is likely an 
overestimate.  
Case Study: Economic and Environmental Impacts of the Renewable Fuel Standard 
The EPAct of 2005 mandated that ethanol be mixed with gasoline. Because the 
majority of RFS requirements are fulfilled using corn ethanol, RFS significantly increases 
the demand for corn. In 2001, ethanol production used only 7% of the U.S. corn crop, 
while in 2015, ethanol production used approximately 38% of it. The laws of supply and 
demand necessitate that an increase in the demand for a good or service must be 
accompanied by an increase in price, holding all else equal. These price increases affect 
every industry that uses corn as an input, including the food industry.  
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A 2010 Congressional Research Service report estimated that the greater corn 
demand for ethanol production will have collectively raised food prices in the U.S. by $3 
billion by 2022. A National Academy of Sciences study found that globally, biofuels 
expansion accounted for 20-40 percent of the food price increases seen in 2007, which 
led to a global food crisis that pushed 100 million people into hunger and sparked riots in 
30 countries.214 Other estimates, such as a 2014 Congressional Budget Office report, say 
that the impact on food prices exists, but is insignificant.215 Although the precise impact 
of the RFS on food prices is unclear, the possibility of a meaningful impact on food 
prices should not be ignored in policy discussions. 
Transporting ethanol is more expensive than shipping gasoline via conventional 
modes, raising prices further. Unlike petroleum products, ethanol and ethanol-blended 
gasoline cannot be shipped by pipeline in the United States. The current distribution 
system for ethanol is dependent on rail cars, tanker trucks, and barges, which are more 
expensive than pipeline transport. Though shipping ethanol or ethanol-blended gasoline 
via pipeline could be feasible, no major U.S. pipeline has made the investments to allow 
such shipments. Even if these modifications are technically possible, they likely will be 
increase ethanol transportation costs.216 
The dramatic increase in RFS-caused ethanol production, especially corn-based 
ethanol, has several negative environmental impacts, including increased carbon 
emissions, greater water scarcity, lower water quality, lower soil quality, and harm to 
wildlife. The amount of energy it takes to produce corn ethanol exceeds the energy 
created when corn ethanol is burned for fuel. A Cornell University study specifically 
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calculated that every time you make 1 gallon of ethanol, there is a net energy loss of 
54,000 BTU.217 
While corn ethanol burns cleaner than conventional gasoline in terms of carbon 
emissions, the whole lifecycle emissions of corn ethanol often generates more pollution 
and carbon than conventional gasoline. Lifecycle emission analyses consider the 
emissions released in every phase in the production, use, and waste disposal of corn 
ethanol, which includes the emissions from fertilizer used to grow corn and the carbon 
that is released when grasslands and forests are converted to corn production.218  
Because corn is more fertilizer-intensive than any other crop that is grown in the 
United States, approximately 2.39 million additional tons of nitrogen fertilizer will be 
needed to meet the 2015 RFS requirements. Greater use of nitrogen fertilizer and 
pesticides degrades water quality in rivers and in oceans. In the Midwest, where the 
majority of corn in the U.S. is grown, fertilizer-laden runoff eventually flows into the 
Mississippi River and contributes to algae blooms in the Gulf of Mexico. These algae 
blooms deplete the region of oxygen and suffocate marine plants and animals. With more 
fertilizer contributing to larger algae blooms, the Gulf of Mexico’s “Dead Zone” likely 
will continue to expand.219 
Growing corn is a water-intensive process and can threaten regional water 
supplies, and mandating and subsidizing corn for ethanol will continue to exacerbate 
water supply problems. Most of this irrigation water is drawn from groundwater aquifers 
in regions that already are stressed. Conflicts over water allotments have occurred in 
Kansas and Nebraska because the Ogallala Aquifer under the Great Plains is shrinking 
rapidly.220  
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Despite the costs associated with RFS mandates, ethanol does very little to 
displace gasoline consumption. Thirty-five percent of the U.S. corn crop was used for 
ethanol in 2009, yet the resultant ethanol accounts only for about five percent of gasoline 
consumption. If the entire 2009 record U.S. corn crop of 13 billion bushels were used as 
ethanol feedstock, they would displace only 18 percent of estimated national gasoline 
use. Under the RFS2 mandate, by 2022 biofuels will still represent less than 25 percent of 
gasoline energy demand.221 
Case Study: Imposing Unfair Liabilities under CERCLA 
CERCLA's liability provisions are unfair for small businesses, who are assigned 
massive EPA fees that severely limit their profitability. The attempts to revise and amend 
CERCLA in 1995 illustrate the injustice of the law’s retroactive liability provisions. 
During these discussions, Senator Larry Pressler of South Dakota told the story of Bill 
Huebner, a South Dakota businessman, to highlight the harsh, unyielding liability 
provisions of the CERCLA. 
 Bill Huebner was the owner of a company called Ace Steel and Recycling, based 
in Rapid City, South Dakota. In 1991, Huebner became a victim of the unfair liability 
provisions of CERCLA when he received a letter from the EPA indicating that he owed 
$47,000 for cleanup actions taken at a former battery recycling site in Nebraska. 
According to the EPA, Huebner was liable for actions taken between 1940 and 1982, 
despite the fact that Huebner's company did not exist prior to 1989. CERCLA’s 
retroactive liability provisions can and do violate the due process rights for some 
potentially responsible parties (PRPs).222  
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 If the EPA mistakenly or unjustly accuses someone of contamination, defendants 
have a difficult time exonerating themselves. Provisions in CERCLA limit the ability of 
accused parties to challenge EPA orders because the law stipulates that any review of the 
EPA's orders must be delayed until after a site has been cleaned.223 In other words, if a 
PRP wants to challenge or dispute an order issued by the EPA, the PRP needs to adhere 
to the order’s commands and then challenge the measure in court, after spending large 
sums of money on cleanup. The other alternative would be the PRP refusing to adhere to 
the EPA’s order and waiting until the EPA performs cleanup, then begins enforcement 
proceedings against the PRP to recoup the cleanup costs, where it could finally defend 
itself.224 Neither option is particularly appealing, and would appear to conflict with 
Constitutional protections of an individual’s right to due process of law. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Over the past several decades, federal environmental policies have been one 
factor in the United States’ rising environmental quality. These same policies, however, 
have caused negative outcomes, such as high costs, inefficiency, market distortions, and 
environmental degradation. Public choice theory explains how federal environmental 
policies can be ineffective or counterproductive. 
Government officials, such as legislators and bureaucrats, are rationally self-
interested and work to maximize their incomes and power. Legislators use environmental 
legislation to enact benefits for special interest groups. These special favors are mutually 
beneficial for the legislator and the special interest group, but the costs of these policies 
are spread out among the rest of the population.  Legislators work strategically to form 
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environmental policies that distort markets in favor of special interests without causing 
enough stress in the rest of the population that would harm the legislator’s chances of 
reelection. Government-caused market distortions skew price signals that communicate 
what people value and impose higher costs on taxpayers and consumers.  
Legislators empower bureaucrats to create rules and regulations that are meant to 
fulfil the intentions of environmental statutes, but these bureaucrats often create 
regulations with minimal scientific evidence or limited consideration of economic 
benefits or costs. The rulemaking process has little effective oversight, causing the 
regulatory burden to grown year after year. As the number of regulations continues to 
mount and the scope of the regulations widens, compliance costs for business owners and 
average Americans also will continue to grow. As regulations continue to regulate less 
pressing problems, the marginal benefit of these regulations continues to decline as the 
marginal cost increases.  
Negative consequences may emerge unintentionally or intentionally. Even the 
most intelligent economists and policymakers cannot have enough information to craft 
flawless laws, and they cannot have enough information to foresee all possible outcomes. 
Therefore, the lawmaking and rulemaking processes spawn outcomes that may not have 
been intended by the policymakers or special interests. Even if unintended consequences 
arise, influential minorities nevertheless may benefit from these outcomes while the rest 
of the population bears a net social cost. Special interest groups will work with 
policymakers to perpetuate these benefits, even if the net effect harms society.  
Regardless of the source of these negative consequences, federal environmental 
policies are not magical solutions to environmental problems. The lawmaking and 
77 
rulemaking processes are made by imperfect, self-interested individuals, and so outcomes 
have proven to be imperfect. To avoid the negative outcomes from policy making, 
society will have to demand better policymaking or embrace market-based solutions.  
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